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Editor’s Note
In this issue, we extend our approach to
Space & Defense as a challenge within the broad
field of inquiry known as political economy. By
this we mean that national defense of “spaces” or
multiple domains for national security involves
more than allocating resources and executing
programs for increasing military capability. It also
entails thinking through strategic problem sets that
include elements of cooperation—international
alliances and domestic negotiations—as well as
competition among military organizations.
Consistent with our aim to open the journal’s
editorial scope and address all relevant frontiers of
defense policy, this issue welcomes contributions
on space, cyber security, artificial intelligence and
nuclear deterrence. General John E. Hyten, thencommander of U.S. Strategic Command,
addressed cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy
(USAFA) for the 2019 Eaker Lecture on
preparing to meet the 21st century deterrence
mission. He has graciously allowed Space &
Defense to publish a lightly edited transcript of his
remarks to future Air and Space Force officers.
In our first feature article, Roger Wortman of the
U.S. Space Force reflects on the mission of
defending vulnerable satellites on orbit. He draws
inspiration from a popular fictional tale, Defence
of Duffer’s Drift, to explain how military science
may be supplemented by game play that entertains
a type of dream world based on reality but flexible
with respect to counterfactuals for adversary plans
of attack. Implications for developing USSF
strategy, operational art, doctrine, and adaptability
in crises ought to hold, regardless of whether or
when international powers choose to weaponize
space.
Abderrahmane Sokri extends the theme of
imperfect defense to the cyber domain. He uses a
clever application of the business-based leaderfollower equilibrium from economic theory to
explore the possibility of a Goldilocks solution for
cyber defense. As in the classic Stackelberg
competition, first mover’s optimal strategy is not
to invest everything he has, for there will be

diminishing rate of return on how much he deters
his adversary. With relatively few, plausible
assumptions on how investment improves
resilience of cyber networks for defender, and
limits benefits for attacker, Sokri conjures a gametheoretic world that offers insights as to how
defender can calibrate just-right spending on
cyber defense and (unlike cyber offense) advertise
his effort with intent to lock an adversary into
predictable equilibrium play.
In this issue, we present two remarkable cadet
papers nurtured by USAFA’s Nuclear Weapons
and Strategy minor and recognized by external
experts on deterrence. Second Lieutenant
Marshall Foster (USAFA ’20) reviews the
burgeoning literature on how artificial intelligence
will affect strategic stability and supplies his own
account based on the interaction of strategic
cultures. Second Lieutenant Liam Connolly
(USAFA ’19) surveys recent pressure on Baltic
states within NATO and raises the importance of
national resilience—a rather complex correlate of
defense spending—for the success of U.S.
extended deterrence in Europe.
Finally, as contributing editor, I review The Death
of Expertise (Oxford, 2017) by Naval War
College professor Tom Nichols. Nichols in the
book is mainly concerned about how status
decline of experts in American society imperils
modern democracy, which depends on elected
representatives as generalists, weighing
competing advice from professionals or accepting
political risk in order to follow the truth presented
by expert consensus. Many of Nichols’ examples
land in the policy areas of health, education, and
economy, but as an international security scholar,
he is aware of additional implications from the
death of expertise for foreign policy and U.S.
strategic competence. Nichols’ challenges, I
argue, are important for civilian analysts and
military officers, the relevant experts, to keep at
the forefront as they prepare the new Space Force,
against rapidly evolving threats, under democratic
civilian control and subordinate to the authority of
elected politicians.

In my case, as is true for all our authors,
contributions herein are academic and do not
represent official policy or opinion of the U.S. Air
Force or the U.S. Space Force.

Damon Coletta
USAFA
January 2021

Senior Leader Voice

As Delivered Remarks
Gen John E. Hyten
On 23 April 2019, Gen Hyten, commander of USSTRATCOM, visited the Air Force Academy to give the
annual Ira C. Eaker lecture on National Defense Policy. Before soon to be graduates and officers, Gen
Hyten discussed how several Air Force career fields, particularly those involving missiles and space,
contribute to successful deterrence in the 21st century. -Editor

Location: U.S. Air Force Academy,
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Event: Eaker Lecture on National
Defense Policy (Edited Transcript for
Clarity)
…I always thought, many times as I look
back, if life would have been different if I’d
gone to the Air Force Academy because one
of the big advantages you guys are about to
experience as you go into the world, into the
United States Air Force, is that you will have
a support structure built in from the day you
come into the service. You will have this
group of people that you had a common
experience with for your four years. As you
go through that structure you will have that
common bond that will pull you together. It’s
an amazing thing. I didn’t have that.
I was the first class back into Harvard after
the Vietnam riots. We had nine students that
were in ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps] that cross-enrolled in MIT
[Massachusetts Institute of Technology] when
I first started. A month into the program there
were only five because we got kicked, cursed,
spat at, assaulted, all on the streets of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, just because we
were wearing the uniform of our nation’s
country. Four of my classmates decided
they’d figure out some other way to pay, but I
couldn’t afford Harvard unless the Air Force
paid for it. So we stayed, the five of us stayed.
Now, the other four are gone as well, and
none served 20 years. So, I don’t have any

classmates still serving. You guys will have
classmates all the way through that you get to
deal with.
…And it’s a special place that you’re about to
join. Whether you’re ’22, ’21, 2019, wherever
you are, you’re about to join the United States
Air Force and I hope you enjoyed some of the
pictures that were in that video you just
looked through. Pictures of the most powerful
combatant command in the world, my
command, U.S. Strategic Command. It is
simply the most powerful command that’s
ever been created. Some of my friends don’t
like it when I say that, but it’s simply the fact.
It’s true. That’s who we are.
But, I want you to think back just a short
period of time in our history when just over a
decade ago that command with all the
capability you just saw was dying on a vine. It
had huge problems. It had morale problems
across the entire force. It got to be so bad, we
loaded a nuclear weapon on a B-52 and flew
it from North Dakota to Louisiana, and until it
got to Louisiana nobody even knew we did it.
We sent missile parts from Hill Air Force
Base in Utah to Taiwan, and didn’t even
know we did it – nuclear missile parts. We
had huge cheating scandals in the nuclear
force on the Navy side as well as the Air
Force side.
How could that happen? How could the most
powerful command in the United States end
up with those kinds of problems? It did
because we took our eye off of what the most
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important thing in our country is, and the
most important thing in our country is our
nation’s security. Our nation’s security is
guaranteed by the capabilities of U.S.
Strategic Command.
We had senior leadership at a northern-tier
missile base who stood up in front of a bunch
of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
operators, a bunch of missileers, a bunch of
the finest people that the nation’s ever
produced, and said you guys need to get out
of the missile business and get into the space
business because the missile business is dying
and the space business is where it’s going to
be happening. That’s not a great way to deal
with the most important mission in the United
States Air Force, to tell the people that
actually do it that they’re a dying mission.
It’s not a dying mission. It’s the most
important mission that we have. Nuclear
deterrence is what this nation’s defense is
based on. From beginning to end, that’s where
it starts. And if you don’t understand that, you
don’t understand the concept of military
power; you don’t understand the concept of
deterrence. Nuclear capabilities are essential
to our nation’s security. And a lot of people
still question that. But you’re about to enter
an Air Force where that nuclear business is
critical to everything that we do, and you need
to understand what that is.
One of the questions that I get more often
than any other question is can you, me,
imagine a world without nuclear weapons?
And the answer is yes. I can imagine a world
without nuclear weapons and everybody in
this room can imagine a world without
nuclear weapons as well. Because you know
what that world looks like? The world before
August of 1945. Somewhere in high school
history or here at the academy you’ve studied
a little bit about World War II. So let’s just

think about the numbers of World War II for a
second.
Between the years 1939 and 1945 the world
killed somewhere between 60 and 80 million
people in World War II. Think about those
numbers. Sixty to 80 million people killed in
a war.
If you do the math, that’s about 33,000 people
a day being killed in World War II. If you
think about this nation’s horrible experience
in Vietnam, and all the heroes that we sent,
our nation’s greatest treasure, our sons and
daughters into Vietnam to fight for our
freedoms, in that horrible experience we lost
58,000 Americans – 58,000 of our sons and
daughters. That’s two days of violence in
World War II. Two days. Imagine every day
that goes by and it’s the entire destruction of
the Vietnam War. Ever since nuclear weapons
were invented that level of destruction went
away. It went away because the nations that
had those nuclear capabilities always had to
be worried about whether they were going to
cross the line that would cause their adversary
to want to use nuclear weapons back against
them. That’s the basis of deterrence.
The basis of deterrence is having a capability
that is so fearful that the adversary won’t
cross that line and won’t ever walk down that
path. That’s what we want to have happen.
But in order for deterrence to work, we have
to be ready to fight that nuclear war each and
every day and that’s the pictures you saw on
the screen. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines of U.S. Strategic Command
practicing that mission every day so that our
adversaries see it and they know it and they
won’t walk down that line. That’s what
nuclear weapons mean in the world of the
21st century.
But we took our eye off it because 9/11
happened. And most of the people in this
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room have no memories of the world before
9/11/2001 because you are not old enough.
And because you don’t have those memories
your entire experience has been focused on
the Global War on Terror. And as we walk
into the future, that global war on terror is not
going to go away. We’ve had great success on
the battlefield in Syria. Great success on the
battlefields of Iraq. Afghanistan is reaching a
place where we’re talking peace with the
Taliban. All those things are looking good,
but I tell you what, terrorism is not going
away. Terrorism is at least a generational
thing. Terrorism is something that you’re
going to have to deal with your entire time in
the military whether it’s a four-year plan like
I had or a 42-year plan like I ended up.
Whatever that plan is, you’re going to be
dealing with terrorism that entire time.
But here’s an interesting thing about the
terrorists that want to attack the United States.
They will never be able to defeat the United
States of America. Ever. We have to protect
our citizens, we have to protect our
capabilities, and they want to terrorize us,
they want to damage us. They’re going to do
those things and we’re going to fight and
defeat them wherever they happen to be. But
they are not an existential threat to this
country.
There’s only two nations on the planet right
now that bring that existential threat who have
a stated purpose of defeating the United
States. The stated purpose to change the
world, to change the entire world order, put
their model on the world order, and not the
United States model, not the Western model,
not our ally model, not the NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] model, and
that’s Russia and China. Russia and China are
once again recognized as potential adversaries
of the United States.

6

Russia all of a sudden became that adversary
again in 2014 when they invaded Crimea. In
2014 they invaded Crimea. They were our
adversaries then. Somehow that was news. If
you actually read what the President of Russia
has said multiple times, as early as 2000. …
Vladimir Putin was elected President of
Russia in March of 2000. In April of 2000 he
gave a speech. In that speech he said they’d
been watching the United States. They’d been
watching NATO.
They’ve been watching what we’ve been
doing in the first Gulf War, in Allied Force.
Now, this was before 9/11. They hadn’t yet
seen how we fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But they understood that we had built this
unbelievably powerful conventional force.
And because of that powerful conventional
force they were going to have to change their
doctrine and focus on their nuclear and
strategic capabilities. They were going to
modernize their nuclear capabilities, and build
a large number of low-yield nuclear weapons
as well. They would also reserve the right to
deploy those low-yield nuclear weapons on a
battlefield in Europe should Russia be
challenged. That doctrine began in April of
2000.
In 2006, Putin announced the full
modernization of the nuclear force, saying the
modernization would be done by 2020. I
won’t tell you the classified numbers, but
they’re going to be pretty close to being done
by 2020. They’ve made multiple speeches
over the time – Putin and the other leadership
of Russia –that this would be their strategy.
But somehow they were our friend. They
were our friend all the way up to 2014 when
suddenly they became a potential adversary
again when they invaded Crimea. That was
just the same part of the strategy they’ve
announced for the 14 years prior to that ever
since Putin was elected.
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This is an adversary we’re going to have to
deal with, and this is an adversary you’re
going to have to deal with. And you better
study your adversary. You better understand
the way they think, why they think that way,
what they’re doing. Look at them as an
adversary.
Look at China. China’s suddenly an adversary
of the United States again as well. Somehow
that’s news as well. The first time I wrote
about China was 1998, and I’ll give you
warning, if you ever write when you’re going
to graduate school, you go on to a fellowship,
or you write a thesis, you better be aware that
somebody’s actually going to read that
someday and hold you accountable for what
you write down.
But, I wrote down in a paper in 1998 what I
thought China was going to be doing in space
and what China was going to be doing as far
as their overall strategy. And you know where
I got that? I got that from the Chinese
publications that had been already written. I
got that from the Chinese students at the
University of Illinois I was going to school
with. They stated exactly what they were
going to do and they’ve been doing it for the
last 20-plus years without fail on that same
strategy. You can find everything that they’re
doing right now in the strategy that was
written in the 1990s, and we just ignored it as
a nation. And we helped China build their
power. Now, China wants to become the
regional power in the Pacific, and now
they’ve started to write about being the global
power by the end of the century.
That’s the world that we live in. Why are they
building islands in the South China Sea? It’s
part of that same strategy. Why are they
building space weapons? It’s part of the same
strategy. Why are they building aggressive
cyber capabilities? It’s part of the same

strategy. And they wrote it down over 20
years ago. But nobody read it.
So, you better study your adversaries and
understand the way they think, the way they
are organized, the way they are trained, and
the way they’re equipped, because someday
we may have to deal with them.
The other piece of the puzzle is to somehow
make sure we never have to deal with them,
which brings us back to deterrence. The last
thing we want to do in this world is go to war
with Russia and China. That’s the last thing
we want to see happen. If anybody thinks that
that’s a good thing for the world you don’t
live in the same world I do. We have to make
sure that never happens, and you do that with
deterrence.
So, deterrence in the 21st century has been a
fascinating discussion. A fascinating
discussion because of the lack of discussion.
So, somehow deterrence in the 21st century is
looked at as STRATCOM’s job. General
Hyten, you’re the STRATCOM commander,
deterrence is your job. And if you read the
Unified Command Plan you’ll find that.
That’s my number one job, strategic
deterrence.
Somehow people think that just because we
have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons and
comply with the New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction] Treaty we deter all our
adversaries, and all you have to do is pick up
a newspaper and read just the beginnings of
that to understand that’s not true. We don’t
deter all behavior because of the existence of
nuclear weapons.
So, what is strategic deterrence in the 21st
century? When I came into command in 2016
we started asking that question. We built an
academic alliance with 35 colleges and
universities to start looking at what is
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deterrence in the 21st century. And we
intentionally didn’t give anybody any answers
when I started just asking the question. What
is deterrence in the 21st century? Just to try to
create a debate. And I would go to places that
fundamentally disagree with the way I think
about nuclear weapons. I would go to
Stanford and Yale and Harvard, and I would
debate the facts with them. I would debate
with people that have differences of opinion
to me about what deterrence is in the 21st
century to try to gather that broader
discussion of what goes on.
If you want to know where the strategic
deterrent theory began, it began in colleges
and universities and the think tanks in this
country like RAND, in the early 1960s with
Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, Bernard
Brodie, many of the folks that you’ve read in
your classes here in this institution came from
that. And when you start thinking about
deterrence, you go back and read them,
because there hasn’t really been anybody in
the 21st century that is of their element. But
we are starting to see that change. We’re
starting to see the beginnings of a new debate
at Georgetown and Stanford and elsewhere,
about different perspectives of what
deterrence is in the 21st century.
And here are the elements. Deterrence now is
a multi-polar problem. Because, you just can’t
focus on Russia and say New START is a
global arms reduction treaty. It’s not. It’s just
two nations. But everything we do with
Russia impacts China. Everything we do with
North Korea impacts Russia. Everything we
do with Russia impacts China. It just goes all
the way around. So we have to think about
everything that we do in this multi-polar
world.
The second piece, it is multi-domain. It is all
domains. All the domains have to come into
fruition. And you’ve heard the Air Force
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concept of Multi-Domain Command and
Control. The Army has a concept called
Multi-Domain Operations. The Navy is
working fleet command and control issues.
All trying to get at the same issue.
But here’s where the challenge really is as we
go forward. The challenge is how do we
integrate global capabilities? How do we
integrate what the Chairman calls global
fires? Because if we ever get into a conflict
with an adversary, there’s going to be nonkinetic and kinetic shooting happening in
space, cyber, air, land and sea all at the same
time, and we have to figure out how with
multiple commanders involved we integrate
all those capabilities together.
So, you want to know what you have to do in
order to become a great joint officer? Just
become a great Airman. This institution is not
building great joint warriors. That will happen
down the road. We’re getting you ready to be
Airmen.
Now, there are other services in this room that
are going as exchange programs in here.
When you go back to your service, whatever
service you came from, become a great
Soldier, a great Sailor, a great Airman, a great
Marine, because what I want as a joint
commander is I want to pull the best domain
expertise I can from every domain that we
operate in, put them all together in a room and
then figure out how to fight together
effectively in all those domains. But what I
don’t want, is I don’t want somebody that
knows a little bit about every domain. I want
a room full of people that know everything
about each domain and then we’ll figure out
how to pull those pieces together.
So, the first thing you’ve got to do is become
an expert in whatever career field you’re
going into. If you’re going to be a pilot,
become the best pilot in the United States Air
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Force. And if you’re going to be a pilot, that
should be your goal. Not just be a good pilot,
but be the best pilot in the United States Air
Force. The best pilot in the United States
military. If you’re going into space, become
the best space warrior there is. If you’re going
into cyber, become a cyber killer. If you’re
going into intel, become the best intel
operator there is. If you’re going into
acquisition, if you’re going into engineering,
become the best. Learn that. That’s what you
have to do for the next 10 years. Then when
the time comes we’re going to take that
expertise and we’re going to put it to use. But
you should never lose that expertise because
that will define who you are. And in your
soul, in your heart as you go forward into the
future, you need to resonate those values.
Because when I look at myself in the mirror,
even though I’m a joint commander, even
though I command Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, my professional identity is an
Airman, and it always will be. That’s the way
it’s got to be.
And yes, I have a deep space background.
And a couple of weeks ago, the day after I
was supposed to be here the last time when I
left because of the storm that came in, I was
testifying with my bosses, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
the Secretary of the Air Force, in front of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the
future of space, and I know that subject well. I
have a vision of what that future’s going to
be. We’re going to make space a real
warfighting domain because it basically
already is. The rest of the world just doesn’t
understand it. We’re going to walk into it.
But, I was challenged about my background
as an Airman, whether the Air Force was the
right place for space. I said, you understand
that when I bleed, I bleed blue because I am
an Airman through and through. But I know
we have also reached the point where space

has to be treated as its own domain, just like
the air was, just like the maritime domain
was, because it is a place where we’re going
to fight and it’s a place we’re going to have to
win, an Air Force that we’re going to build
around it, and I believe the fact that it’s still
going to be in the United States Air Force is
exactly right.
We’re going to get into Q&A in a minute, and
that’s my favorite part, so we’re going to have
plenty of time for Q&A. But I would ask you
to identify yourself. I’m going to ask you
some questions here and I don’t want you to
raise your hand, I don’t want you to
embarrass yourself, I don’t want you do
anything stupid. But I’m just going to ask you
some basic questions that every Airman
should know the answer to. This is our
history. This is our history as a United States
Air Force and you should know these names
off the back of your hand. And if we’re not
teaching you these names at the Air Force
Academy we’re doing something wrong. But
this is the basics of who we are.
I’m going to ask you the easy question first.
That is, who is the father of space and
missiles in the United States Air Force?
That’s the easy one. That’s Gen. Bernard
Schriever.
Gen. Bernard Schriever basically invented the
ICBM. He invented the spy satellite. He
invented the rocket inside the military. He’s
the guy that was there. One of my great
experiences of my life was as a young major
to be told by the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, Gen. [Merrill] Tony McPeak – I was
the idiot major in that story, by the way, but I
don’t need to go into that. But going to
Andrews get a C-21, taking off to California,
pick up Gen. Schriever and take him to places
X, Y, and Z and show him what we’re doing
in space in the United States Air Force.
General Schriever was criticizing the Air
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Force and General McPeak. I got to sit in the
back of that C-21 and receive a lecture from
Gen. Schriever that I’ll never forget because
he told me how we were screwing up in the
Air Force, not treating space the way it should
be treated. So he was the father of space and
missiles.
Here’s a second question. I’m going to make
you raise your hand real quick. How many in
here are aerospace engineers? A bunch of
you. Who invented the term aerospace?
<pause>
Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, fourth chief of staff, 1959. A
hearing in front of Congress. Eight times
during the hearing he used the term
‘aerospace,’ as the indivisible spectrum of
operations from air to space that has to
happen for the United States Air Force to
control the high ground of the future.
A funny story-- Gen. [Dwight] Beach, an
Army general testifying a short time later.
They asked General Beach, General White
keeps using this term aerospace. What do you
think about that term? And seriously, you can
look it up in the Congressional Record,
General Beach goes, “I always heard of
armospace.”
Armospace didn’t stick. Aerospace stuck.
Because air and space are the areas we have
to control.
Who is the general most responsible for
creating Air Force Space Command? The
command I commanded until 2016. Gen.
[Jerome] Jerry O’Malley, commander of
Tactical Air Command. The fighter pilot’s
fighter pilot. When he was a wing commander
at Beale, he flew the SR-71, the U-2, he got
read into these classified space programs, and
he looked at it and said there’s all this space
stuff going on but none of it gets to the
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warfighter. So, when he became the XO
[director for operations] of the Air Force, now
the A3 of the Air Force, he started working
with the chiefs of staff, one of them being
[Gen.] Lew Allen, and said we need to create
a command that is focused on the operational
application of space to the battlefield. That
would be Air Force Space Command.
Here’s the thing about those three people –
General Schriever, General White, General
O’Malley – they were all fighter pilots. They
were all pilots. And somehow the popular
culture has reached the point where somehow
the world doesn’t think that pilots care about
space and that’s so untrue. Not only do they
care about space, our chief of staff cares about
space as much as anybody I know; the general
officers I work with care about space as much
as anybody I know. But it was actually
invented by pilots because that was the future
of the United States Air Force. That’s where
we’re going to go. And everyone in this room
should be able to tell that story.
And what is it all about? It’s all about our
nation’s most important mission. It’s all about
strategic deterrence in the 21st century,
because strategic deterrence is going to come
from being able to control the air, control
space, control cyberspace, having a nuclear
deterrent that is ready and able to respond to
any threat. That is the structure that we’re
going to have. That’s where it all comes
together. And that’s what you need to know
when you go into the Air Force and you
become second lieutenants. And you’re not
going to think about it for a while. You’re just
going to think about flying planes, and
operating satellites and operating in
cyberspace, and providing intel and building
stuff. That’s what you’re going to think about
for the next decade and that’s great.
But if you remember nothing else from today,
remember that we have adversaries in this
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world that we don’t want to go to war with.
The only way to avoid that war is be ready to
go to war and to defeat them in a war on any
day that the nation requires us to. That’s what
we’re supposed to do in the United States Air
Force. That’s what we’re supposed to do at
STRATCOM. That’s what we’re supposed to
do in the United States military, and we need
to be ready to do that.
I will stop there and just say thanks for the
decision that you’ve made to come to this
institution. Thanks for what you’re about to
do as you go forward into whatever service,
whatever nation, whatever structure you’re
going into. But if you’re going into the Air
Force, understand that we just want you to be
great Airmen, because great Airmen and great
Soldiers, great Sailors, great Marines are what
makes a great joint force – not great joint
warriors.

Article

Duffer’s Drift and Space Operations
Roger Wortman
Defence of Duffer’s Drift, a popular Boer War tale among British infantry officers, teaches lessons for the
future of space operations.

Published in the early 20th Century, The
Defence of Duffer’s Drift is a work of fiction
written as an educational tool for small unit
leaders.1 The novella outlines the experiences
of a young lieutenant and his tumultuous path
to success when charged with defending key
terrain. Told through a series of dreams,
Duffer’s Drift provides multiple tactical
lessons through an iterative process, each
building on the previous sequence. The
officer fails multiple times while learning
from various mistakes while incrementally
moving toward success.2 Although the work
focuses on ground combat and maneuver
warfare, the principles addressed can be
applied to a variety of fields. As such,
Duffer’s Drift is often suggested as
professional development reading for many
service members regardless of career field.3
The author, British Army Captain Ernest
Dunlop Swinton, based the story on his own
experiences during the Boer War of 18991902. Although Duffer’s Drift draws from
Swinton’s days as a small unit leader, lessons
within the tale move beyond tactical
considerations and reinforce a wide array of
combined arms principles. This enriches the
story while also foretelling Swinton’s
eventual career progression as a professor,
historian, war correspondent, and a forefather
of armored warfare. Eventually attaining the
rank of Major General, Swinton retired in
1
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1919 and is considered one of Britain’s
leading military thinkers. 4
The structure and flow of Duffer’s Drift is
reminiscent of a short autobiography vice an
instructional pamphlet. Its first person
narrative invites the reader to trust the
author’s authenticity while remaining open to
the ideas and education provided through
each dream sequence. Its time loop plot
device is instantly recognizable by modern
readers, although Swinton’s pacing and
adjustments through each dream enable the
story to unfold naturally while avoiding
needless repetition. At thirty-two pages,
Duffer’s Drift uses this simple and effective
storytelling technique to educate the reader on
the complexities of ground warfare.
Additionally, this literary approach provides
easy to absorb lessons and professional
education for all ranks and career fields.
LESSONS OF DUFFER’S DRIFT
The story’s protagonist, Lieutenant
Backsight Forethought, leads a light infantry
unit deployed to southern Africa in service of
the British Empire. Although the backdrop for
Duffer’s Drift is the Boer War circa early
1900s, the tale avoids commentary on
geopolitical issues or reasoning for the
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LLC, 2014.
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conflict.5 Instead, the focal point of the story
is how the officer navigates the complexities
of warfare. The story itself begins with the
lieutenant falling asleep after arriving at a
river fording site he and his fifty men are
charged with defending. Each vivid dream
sequence pertains to the defense of the drift;
and each sequence results in disaster for the
lieutenant’s men and mission. Yet, as the
dreams progress, the lieutenant applies
lessons learned to the subsequent scenario. A
clear example is seen in the first dream
sequence and its influence in decisions made
in the second iteration.
In the first dream the lieutenant waits until the
next day to begin defensive preparations.
Sentries are placed around his forces to
provide security; though little thought is
employed to their positions. He allows local
salesmen into the encampment to barter with
his men. Tents are erected in plain view and
consolidated. The enemy soon arrives; the
battle is quick and destructive. The British
element sustains multiple casualties and those
who survive become prisoners. Reviewing his
actions during defensive preparations, the
lieutenant identifies four lessons learned:6
- Do not delay in preparing defenses.
- Placement and concealment of sentries is
critical.
- Do not allow anyone other than your
own forces into the perimeter.

at his disposal, the lieutenant incorporates
previous lessons. He begins defensive
preparations immediately, keeps locals out,
properly prepares sentries, and ensures his
men can fit into the entrenchments to defend
against enemy fires. The enemy eventually
attacks, and Lieutenant BF’s unit is again
overrun. However, the lieutenant reviews
what happened and identifies lessons learned
to be applied at the third iteration.
The series of dreams ends after six cycles,
each building on previous events. Throughout
the novella concepts such as defense against
heavy weaponry, operational security,
management of the local population, seizing
the initiative, and many others are identified
by the lieutenant. Every learning point is
incorporated in the following defensive plan,
and on the sixth dream the British defense
succeeds. Despite this story being over one
hundred years old, The Defence of Duffer’s
Drift remains relevant to modern battlefields.7
The iterative nature of the narrative structure
combined with an almost scientific approach
to testing and validation proves its value as an
educational tool and timeless classic for any
maneuver warfare officer. Moreover, the
lessons included in Duffer’s Drift are not
limited to educating infantry professionals.
Concepts such as placement of forces,
operational security, involvement of local
populations and more are facets of warfare
that apply to every career field, even space
professionals.
VALIDITY IN THE SPACE DOMAIN

- Concealment in tents does not provide
cover.
The second dream serves as a reset of the
battlefield. With a fresh complement of forces
Melissa and Michelle Tusan, “Fault Lines of Loyalty:
Kipling's Boer War Conflict/War and the Victorians:
Response,” Victorian Studies 58, no. 2 (Winter, 2016):
314-31.
5
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and sea are the most widely known. These
domains are not intended to be examined
independently, but rather collectively to
understand interdependencies during conflict.
Recently, the domains of cyber and space
were added to reinforce their importance to
modern military operations.8
The space domain is highly technical and can
be intimidating to the uninitiated. Space
operations involve orbital mechanics,
communication linkages, relay sites on the
ground, and airborne assets.9 Space
operations are replete with the latest
technology, but they are not necessarily
unique in tactics and strategy. At high levels,
space operations succeed in the same manner
as any other military force. They must ensure
mission readiness while maintaining
survivability. Maneuver forces use the term,
‘shoot, move, communicate’ as a sort of
mantra when operating in a battlespace. Space
assets are no different. Space focused units
must be able to ensure each asset can
accomplish its designed mission (shoot),
reposition for the next objective (move), and
synchronize actions to reinforce unity of
effort (communicate). The ways and means
that space focused units accomplish this are
varied due to the exoatmospheric nature of the
mission, but fundamentals are the same.
Although Swinton focused his teaching points
on tactical/operational concepts such as fields
of fire, points of domination, and unity of
effort, a wider examination reveals valuable
insights into educating space professionals.
Collectively, the lessons in Duffer’s Drift can
be cataloged into three overarching themes
applicable to space operations: initiative,
Behling, Thomas G., “Ensuring a Stable Space
Domain for the 21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly
no. 47 (Fourth, 2007): 105-8.
9
Department of Defense, JP 3-14 Space Operations,
Washington, D.C., April 2018.
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operational security, and battlefield
positioning. Analyzing each of these themes
through the lens of space operations shows
how Swinton’s novella applies to the space
domain and reinforces its value to today’s
space professionals.
Initiative
Initiative is critical for land operations. In
Duffer’s Drift, this is addressed in two ways.
First, the lieutenant delays preparing defenses
until the next morning. This decision results
in lost time, effort, and opportunity toward
establishing a foothold along the river. The
result for the British forces is disastrous due
to ill preparedness. Although space operations
do not involve construction of parapets, they
do necessitate defensive protections against
an adversary.10 From a strategic perspective
the lesson of initiative (while on the
defensive) manifests in assessing enemy
capabilities and including countermeasures
during the satellite design phase. To support
this, coordination between research and
development (R&D) professionals and the
intelligence community can ensure
appropriate threat mitigation capabilities are
included in new space assets.11 For the space
community, seizing the initiative means
investing in early stages of the R&D cycle, so
officers never have to wait until after
experiencing catastrophe to develop new
countermeasures.
A second example comes later in the story
when the lieutenant and his men fail to exploit
an opportunity to strike first. The enemy is at
first unaware of British positions, and an
initial volley of rifle fire could turn the battle
in the defenders’ favor. Yet, the lieutenant
10
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does not give the order. An opportunity to
seize the initiative is lost, and disaster ensues.
While U.S. space assets are not yet equipped
with strike capability, a linkage to the lesson
on initial fires still applies: allocating
satellites at the earliest point of sufficient
information.
Space capabilities are primarily an enabling
function for other domains. Whether
providing positioning/navigation/timing
services, relaying critical communications,
remote sensing, or other functions, satellites
require a great deal of planning and
coordination.12 The lesson from Duffer’s
Drift, then, is to identify and prepare assets at
the earliest possible point of oncoming
conflict. By rapidly taking action, the space
community can ensure appropriate platforms
are available when needed, enabling those
first, highly effective, initial fires from other
domains.
Operational Security
A clear example from Duffer’s Drift of an
operational security lesson involves a local
trader. The trader seeks an opportunity to sell
his wares to the British soldiers. The
lieutenant not only allows this man to trade,
but he lets him bring his items into camp. It is
only when this dream series is complete that
the lieutenant realizes his mistake. The trader
has reported the location of the camp, its
internal defenses, strength of the British
compliment, weapons available, and other
forms of valuable information to the enemy
commander. Undetected, the lieutenant let a
spy into camp. The lesson here is one which
applies not only to space operations, but to
any field or industry, be wary of who,
regardless of uniform, has access to sensitive
information.
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Space operations dazzle with high technology
satellites and large launch vehicles, but the
central node of any organization is always
people. Monitoring who has access to
sensitive sites and plans is a requirement for
any leader. Swinton’s lesson for space
professionals can be expanded to include
network access, information sharing,
operations planning, asset capabilities, and
much more. This is especially important in
today’s globalized society. Meeting the
multitude of threats across the globe requires
partnership and cooperation.13 It is imperative
to balance the good faith effort of cooperating
with multinational coalitions against the
priority of ensuring security protocols for
protecting space capabilities.
Battlefield Positioning
The story of Duffer’s Drift is a defensive
one. The lieutenant is charged to defend
terrain with a small force against a potentially
larger enemy. Tactics in this type of operation
are different from an assault or raid. Solid
defense relies on being able to withstand
overwhelming firepower. In each dream from
the story—except the last—British forces,
despite their previous training, succumb to
enemy violence. Many of the lessons in
Swinton’s tale, then, focus on how to defend
properly and ensure that each soldier is best
able to survive the fight. In the story, ultimate
success is accomplished through optimal
positioning of forces. Terrain dictates much of
the defense, and issues such as dead space in
fields of fire, proximity to enemy front lines,
and spacing of men are all examined in detail.
Of particular relevance to space operations is
a lesson addressing flanking. In the story, the
lieutenant and his men lose control of the
battle. The enemy maneuvers forces to the
13
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flanks of British defenses. Chaos ensues as
the lieutenant’s men receive hostile fire from
multiple angles. Lack of protection on the
flanks along with inadequate planning for that
scenario results in yet another massacre at the
hands of the enemy. Once again, the
lieutenant is forced to analyze in detail how
he failed. Protecting a flank is, of course, a
basic consideration for any ground officer.
Maritime and air components are concerned
about this threat as well. Space is no different.
Although space is big, it is also, in terms of
competitive interactions, crowded. There are
multiple actors, both government and private,
operating in space.14 There is an obvious
terrestrial threat from ground-launched
antisatellite weapon systems, but that is not
the only front. In fact, where orbital assets are
concerned, the “front,” and by implication
vulnerable flanks, are everywhere. Space
professionals should keep this lesson in mind
when planning operations. Kinetic attacks
from the planet are not the only way to defeat
an orbital asset. Attacks can come from the
digital realm in the form of cyber. Laser
technology has developed and diffused
rapidly, and as a result it can interfere with
satellite operations from multiple directions.
Jamming signals along an entire spectrum are
another threat from either ground or spacebased assets.15 The architecture of space
operations is expanding so fast that every
conceivable attack vector can be considered a
satellite or constellation “flank.”
AN OVERARCHING LESSON
Tucked between the pages of Swinton’s
novella are additional lessons for use in
professional development. Each is clearly
explained after the dream sequence and
incorporated into the next defense. In
Morin, Jamie, “Four Steps to Global Management of
Space Traffic,” Nature 567, no. 7746 (Mar 07, 2019):
25-7.
14

addition, Duffer’s Drift provides general
guidance that is less explicit. These lessons
and guides apply to every field regardless of
service and can be incorporated in every
leader’s approach.
The novella, for example, implies the
lieutenant is fresh out of military education
and training. He is depicted as determined to
use his recently acquired knowledge to the
fullest extent possible. Yet, it is clear the
lieutenant is flummoxed when his training
does not provide direct, formulaic solutions
for his mission. To reinforce the idea,
Swinton includes this quote, “Now if they had
given me a job like fighting the Battle of
Waterloo…or Bull Run, I knew all about that,
as I had crammed it up....”
Although critical for the narrative and used to
underscore the lieutenant’s irritation in the
moment, there are deeper lessons to be drawn.
First, knowing military history and gaming
the intricacies of simulated battles does not
guarantee success. Studying a variety of
tactical, operational, and strategic actions in
any battle scenario helps tell that conflict’s
story; however, those solutions are guaranteed
only to those battles. Each war has its unique
aspects, variables, and constraints, limiting
the reach of military science. The lesson
Swinton is explaining with this quote is to
work the problem of the current fight,
recognizing it has its own set of variables, not
just fresh parameters in the same old formula.
It is still important to appreciate the historical
record or summary statistics from thousands
of simulation runs, but these can never be
useful unless officers retain their skepticism:
at some point the record will fall short since it
cannot emulate actual fighting conditions.
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The lesson is especially important for today’s
fledgling space community. The U.S. Space
Force is [sic] shy of its first birthday, but it
claims mature strategic importance with direct
representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.16
Its presence on this august council
emphasizes the growing role of space
capabilities in U.S. strategic thinking. Prior to
the creation of USSF, space activities were
dispersed throughout the services. Each
branch of the military held its own space
interests and operations.17 The U.S. Air Force
(USAF) was the largest contingent with a
variety of units and roles related to space
falling under its mission. As such, the military
space community, always a joint venture, was
nonetheless dominated by USAF operations
and culture.
Naturally, USSF will bring much of this
culture and business process to its new
service, which remains within the Department
of the Air Force. However, the independent
JCS seat signals USSF will not be a simple
extension of the Air Force.18 Space Force
faces qualitatively new challenges and will be
compelled to develop its own approaches to
frame and solve these military problems. The
deep well of USAF business practices
combined with collective experience of the
partner services will support USSF as it
evolves. Still, it is crucial for this new
organization to balance legacy processes with
tailored solutions in the midst of unrelenting
operations tempo.
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The pensive lieutenant facing a novel
challenge at Duffer’s Drift, through his
dreaming (that can be read as gaming) applied
his imagination to expand his real-life
chronological hours for iteration and
refinement of traditional tactics. Likewise,
USSF relative to older branches ought to
leave its door unusually open to investment in
the demanding legwork of testing new ideas
and radical concepts even as it
professionalizes the service.
In the years since Swinton’s story was
published, a great many aspects of warfare
have changed, of course. Weapons are
deadlier. Communication has increased in
speed and volume. Points on the globe are
closer due to faster means of transportation.
Access to space for the United States has
become a routine expectation. These advances
obscure but do not undermine the validity of
Swinton’s lessons. If anything, they make
them more urgent. Space is not yet
weaponized, but it must be considered in the
context of military operations, subject to
analysis through the lens of geopolitical
conflict. Swinton’s classic story of a young
lieutenant faced with a complex, evolving
mission can serve as a contemporary tool for
space professionals, an early guide to how
they can defend this critical domain.
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Deterrence in Cyberspace: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Abderrahmane Sokri
This novel application of the Stackelberg leader-follower game from economic theory illuminates
situational constraints that point to a sweet spot, an optimal level of investment in cyber defense, for
deterrence by denial.

Deterrence is a form of persuasion
intended to manipulate the cost-benefit
analysis of would-be attackers and convince
them that the cost of taking an action against
the defender outweighs its potential benefit
(Brantly, 2018; Wilner, 2017).1 It is the
prevention (of a target) from committing
unwanted behavior by fear of the
consequences (United States (US)
Department of Defense (DoD), 2008; Taipale,
2010). Deterrence differs from compellence
by focusing on prevention using ex ante
actions. Compellence uses power to force an
adversary, post hoc, to take a desired action
under threat of possible escalation in the
future (Brantly, 2018).
Two types of deterrence are generally used:
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by
denial. Deterrence by punishment hinges on
the threat of retaliation against a potential
attacker. This tit-for-tat or equivalent
retaliation strategy adds to the attacker’s
perceived cost. Deterrence by denial sends a
signal to potential challengers that they will
be unsuccessful. This impenetrability strategy
subtracts from the attacker’s perceived
benefits.
In the physical world, deterrence aims to
dissuade specific actions against physical
assets. In this space, the most common form
of deterrence by punishment is the use of
nuclear weapons. These weapons are
inherently an existential threat against
1
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potential challengers (Brodie et al., 1946;
Brantly, 2018). An all-out nuclear war could
be threatened but never fought to achieve
reasonable political objectives (Freedman,
2004; Brantly, 2018). Deterrence by denial
may include tightening defense around a
critical infrastructure to deny attacker access.
The target can be tightly defended by
installing, for example, more security
mechanisms and higher walls.
In the cyber domain, deterrence is more
complex than in the physical domain. Digital
attacks go beyond geographic and political
boundaries. They are generally highly
dynamic and imperceptible to the human
senses (Moisan and Gonzalez, 2017; Sokri,
2019b). A cyber-attack may result in
interception, degradation, modification,
interruption, fabrication, or unauthorized use
of an information asset. The information asset
can be physically (e.g., hardware) or logically
(e.g., software) based (Sokri, 2019a).
Cyber-attacks can be segregated into two
main categories: targeted attack and
opportunistic attack. A targeted attack
requires a large effort and has the potential to
cause significant damage to the defender.
Denial of service and theft of information are
typical targeted attacks. In contrast, an
opportunistic attack has a number of
intermediate targets, requires a small effort,
and tends to cause less damage. A virus and
spam e-mail are typical opportunistic attacks.
Operational Research and Analysis. Copyright for this
article remains with the Crown, Canada.
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The most challenging problem in cyber
deterrence is the attribution dilemma (Wilner,
2017). Determining who to blame for an
attack may be very difficult and timeconsuming to do. Consequently, the
credibility of any deterrence by punishment in
digital space will depend on the blame
attribution. (Glaser, 2011; Brantly, 2018).
Since deterrence by denial does not require
identification of potential attackers, it can be
used to mitigate this dependency (Bordelon,
2016).
Cyber risk is present when a given threat
meets a vulnerability in an information
system allowing it to manifest. In this context,
a threat is a potential cause of an unwanted
occurrence while a vulnerability is a
weakness in the information system (Sokri,
2019a; Zhang, 2012; Bowen et al., 2006). To
minimize digital risk against an information
asset, the defender should know at least two
elements: (1) the probability of a successful
attack and (2) the corresponding potential loss
(Brantly, 2018; Glaser, 2011; Schneidewind,
2011; Branagan, 2012).
To protect their information assets against
offensive cyber-attacks, policy makers are
increasingly gravitating towards deterrence by
denial (Taipale, 2010). A key decisionvariable in digital deterrence by denial is the
defender investment level in security. To
protect a potential target, the defender can
reduce the probability of a successful attack
by investing in information security. The
investment may, for example, reduce the
vulnerability of the target.
The aim of this paper is to show how
deterrence by denial as a defense strategy can
be formulated in cyberspace using a
sequential game with a disclosure mechanism.
It shows the suitability of game theory to
cyber deterrence. The paper extends existing

models by providing a new game formulation
of deterrence using a more intuitive
probability of a successful attack. It also
combines stochastic simulation and gametheoretic approaches to handle uncertainty in
the input data. A simulation could, for
example, incorporate uncertainty on the
model variables and parameters by changing
their static values to statistical distributions.
Consider a sequential security game played
between two adversarial agents: a defender D
(the leader) and a strategic attacker A (the
follower). The defender anticipates the
attacker’s reaction, determines, and credibly
communicates the security investment to
protect an information system. The defender
can, for example, publicly release his level of
investment in (1) detection and prevention
techniques such as Antivirus software,
Firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and (2) physical monitoring and
inspection procedures (Sokri, 2019b).
Revenue agencies usually use this tactic by
revealing their auditing strategies to deter tax
evasion (Cavusoglu et al., 2008).
The attacker observes the defender’s decision
and reacts with a certain level of willingnessto-attack. The true willingness-to-attack is
latent and, therefore, not directly observable.
It is modeled as the expected effort to be
exerted by the attacker to compromise the
system. The attacker’s effort corresponds to
the first activities of the cyber kill chain
(Mihai et al., 2014). These activities
particularly include (but are not limited to):
1. Reconnaissance – the process of
collecting information about the
system,
2. Weaponization – the process of
analyzing the collected data to select
the appropriate attack technique, and
3. Delivery – the process of
transmitting the weapon to the
targeted system.
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Following this introduction, section 2, below,
provides a comprehensive review of literature
on security investment as a deterrence factor.
Section 3, sets up a new game theoretic model
of deterrence in cyberspace. Section 4,
computes the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Section 5 offers a formal discussion about the
main results. Some concluding remarks are
indicated in section 6.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Identifying and understanding the
factors influencing the decision to invest in
information security is a key requirement for
any effective deterrence and risk management
in cyberspace. These factors form the pillars
of the appropriate level of security
investment. Security investment as a
deterrence factor has been an active research
area in the last decade. This literature can be
divided into two main categories: decision
theory and game theory approaches
(Cavusoglu et al., 2008).
The decision-theoretic approach uses
traditional risk analysis and cost–benefit
perspectives for security investment
decisions. This approach assesses the risk
associated with security breaches and
conducts a cost-benefit analysis to determine
a certain level of security investment to
mitigate the risk. While this approach can
assess the economic value of intangible costs
and benefits, it has two main limitations: (1) It
does not determine the optimal security
investment level. (2) It does not allow a
defender’s security investment to influence
the attacker’s behaviour.
Al-Humaigani and Dunn (2003), for example,
proposed a model to quantify the return on
security investment (ROSI). The authors
enumerated the fundamental components of
ROSI for every organization and security
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threat. They included what it costs to invest in
information security spending (e.g., the cost
of procuring the security tool or software, the
losses in reputation and goodwill). They
incorporated both the pre- and post- system
implementation security measures.
In order to come through the first limitation of
the decision-theoretic approach, Gordon and
Loeb (2002) presented an economic model
that determines the optimal amount to invest
in information security. Their results indicate
that defenders may be better off concentrating
their efforts on information assets with
midrange vulnerabilities. Extremely
vulnerable information assets may be very
expensive to protect. For some broad classes
of security breach probability functions,
results also indicate that optimal investment
never exceeds 37% of the expected loss.
Hausken (2006) examined the effect of
different returns assumptions on the optimal
level of investment. The author showed that
optimal investment level may no longer be
capped at 37% of expected loss. For an
alternative class of security breach probability
functions, the optimal investment can increase
convexly in vulnerability and exceed 37%.
More recently, Mayadunne and Park (2016)
used the expected utility approach to analyze
information security investment decisions.
They provided a comparison between the
decisions made by a risk taking and a risk
neutral decision maker. They found, for
example, that for a group of information
assets with equal value and varying
vulnerabilities, the risk neutral decision maker
will diversify security investment to a greater
extent and the risk taker will invest a larger
amount when protecting the high risk assets in
the group.
The game-theoretical approach uses game
oriented models to capture the strategic
interactions between rational attackers and
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defenders. Optimal investment in security is
one of the defenders’ resulting strategies. This
approach has two main challenges: (1)
Validity of the game-theoretic assumptions in
cyberspace (e.g., rationality of players). (2)
Complexity of the cyber domain scenarios
(e.g., dynamic attacks and complex
networks).
Cavusoglu et al. (2008), for example, argued
that the old decision-theoretic approach is
incomplete because it does not take into
account the strategic nature of the interaction
between attackers and defenders. The authors
used a game-theoretic model to determine the
optimal security investment level. Results
indicate that the defender generally enjoys a
higher payoff than that in the decision theory
approach. The gap between the two results
decreases over time and the rate of
convergence depends on the defender learning
model.
Wu et al. (2015) used game theory to model
the relationship between the optimal
information security investment and the
characteristics of defenders’ security
environment. Results indicate that defenders
are better off not investing in security (outside
best practices) until the potential loss reaches
a certain value. They should focus on the
midrange of intrinsic vulnerabilities. When
the potential loss is catastrophic, they should
adopt other measures and stop investing in
security.
More recently, Pan et al. (2017) suggested an
optimal investment strategy using a gametheoretic framework. The authors concluded
that the defender is better off using a single
security level to protect all the information
assets instead of using different security
levels to protect different assets. The
interested reader is referred to Sokri (2019a)
and Sokri (2019b) for further information on
game theory in cyber defense.

A “STACKELBERG”
DETERRENCE MODEL
The system is characterized by an
inherent vulnerability 𝑣0 . Each successful
attack can result in a potential loss l to the
defender and a possible benefit b to the
attacker. The loss/benefit occurring can be
tangible (e.g., monetary loss/benefit) or
intangible (e.g., loss/gain in reputation).
Probability of a successful attack
Let 𝑖 be the defender’s security
investment and 𝑡 the attacker’s level of effort
to expend in hacking the defender. The
compound probability p of a successful attack
can be expressed as the product of the
probability that the vulnerability may be
exploited, 𝑣(𝑖), and the threat probability
(i.e., the probability to receive an attack) (Wu
et al, 2015):
(1)

𝑡

𝑝 = 𝑣(𝑖) (1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (− 𝜇 )),

where the expected effort 𝑡 can be expressed
in terms of time. The threat probability, also
known as the probability of attack (prior to
information about target vulnerability), is
written in Equation 1 as the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of an
exponentially distributed random variable
evaluated at 𝑡. This CDF estimates the
probability that the attacker’s level of effort
will be less than 𝑡. The parameter 𝜇 represents
the mean effort to attack (e.g., investigation,
identification, weaponization done prior to
knowledge of target defenses). It also
represents the standard deviation of the
distribution.
As in Wu et al. (2015), the defender’s security
investment does not directly affect the
inherent threat probability. The defender can
only reduce the first term, probability that the
vulnerability may be exploited, using security
investment 𝑖. That is,
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(2)

𝑣(𝑖) = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖),

where the parameter 𝛼 > 0. Straightforward
derivation leads to
(3)

𝑣 ′ (𝑖)
𝑣(𝑖)
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This probability depends on the defender
investment level and the attacker’s effort
level, in addition to the system’s inherent
vulnerability.
Defender's loss and attacker's payoff

= −𝛼,

which means that the parameter 𝛼 is the decay
rate of the probability that the vulnerability
may be exploited. It represents the rate at
which vulnerability decreases with investment
in cybersecurity. It can also be seen as a
measure of investment productivity. It
measures how efficiently security investment
is used to reduce the asset vulnerability.
One can also readily see that 𝑣(𝑖) satisfies the
following three assumptions.
 Assumption 1. 𝑣(0) = 𝑣0 .
 Assumption 2. lim 𝑣(𝑖) = 0.
i→∞
′ (𝑖)

 Assumption 3. 𝑣
𝑑2 𝑣(𝑖)

=

𝑑𝑣(𝑖)
𝑑𝑖

< 0,

𝑣 ′′ (𝑖) = 𝑑𝑖 2 > 0, ∀𝑖.
Assumption 1 states that if there is no
investment in security, the vulnerability of the
system will be the inherent vulnerability.
Assumption 2 states that no finite investment
can eradicate the vulnerability from
information systems. Because of their
complexity, perfect security is impossible
(Wu et al., 2015). Assumption 3 states that the
investment in security reduces the probability
that the vulnerability may be exploited, but at
a decreasing rate. Investment makes the
system more secure, but with declining
marginal return.
The probability of vulnerability exploitation is
formulated in Equation 2 as an exponentially
decreasing function of the security
investment. Consequently, the probability of a
successful attack can now be written as

In this game the defender seeks to find
the optimal security investment that
minimizes the following total cost
(5)

𝑊𝐷 = 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡)𝑙 + 𝑖,

where the first term of its right-hand side is
the defender’s expected loss due to a
successful attack. The attacker seeks to
maximize the following payoff
(6)

𝑊𝐴 = 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡)𝑏 − 𝑡,

where the first term of the right-hand side is
the attacker’s expected benefit and the second
term represents the expected effort to
compromise the system.
Deterrence game’s equilibrium

This section characterizes the optimal
solution to the deterrence game. As in the
standard Stackelberg competition, the game is
sequential: the defender moves first,
committing to a strategy before the attacker
reacts. The defender's strategic choice is to
select the optimal security investment
(deterrence by denial). The attacker’s choice
is to determine his appropriate level of effort.
The outcome of this leader-follower
interaction is called Stackelberg equilibrium.
This equilibrium has been recognized as a
sound theoretical framework for modeling the
strategic interactions between attackers and
defenders (Jain et al., 2010; Korzhyk et al.,
2011; Kiekintveld et al., 2015; Acquaviva,
2017).
Proposition 1. The following condition is
satisfied at equilibrium

(4)
𝑡

𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖) (1 − exp (− 𝜇)).
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𝜕𝑝(𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑡

𝑏=−

𝜕𝑝(𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑖

Proof. The derivative of t with respect to i is

𝑙.

(12)

Proof. Assuming an interior solution, the
first-order condition (maximizing attacker
payoff with respect to effort, t) for the
attacker optimization problem is
(8)

𝑑𝑊𝐴
𝑑𝑡

=

𝜕𝑝(𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑡

𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑖

= −𝛼𝜇 < 0.

∎
Proposition 4. Assuming an interior solution,
the defender optimal security investment level
is given by

𝑏 − 1 = 0.

(13)

The optimality condition for the defender
problem is

1

𝑖 = 𝛼 ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0 ).

Proof. Equations 4 and 5 imply that
(9)

𝑑𝑊𝐷
𝑑𝑖

=

𝜕𝑝(𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑖

𝑙 + 1 = 0.

(14)
𝑡

𝑊𝐷 = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖) (1 − exp (− 𝜇)) 𝑙 + 𝑖.

Equations 8 and 9 lead to the equilibrium
condition in the Proposition.
∎
Fixing the defender’s security investment to
some strategy 𝑖, the first problem to be solved
is to find the attacker’s best response to 𝑖. In
this optimization problem, the follower
maximizes his expected benefit given 𝑖.

The expression of 𝑡 in Equation (10) is
equivalent to
(15)

𝑡

𝜇

exp (− 𝜇 ) = 𝑏𝑣 exp(𝛼𝑖).
0

𝑡

Proposition 2. Assuming an interior solution,
the optimal effort the attacker is willing to
exert is given by
(10)

𝑏𝑣0

𝑡 = −𝛼𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇ln (

𝜇

)

Proof. After substitution for 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡), Equation
6 becomes

Substituting for exp (− 𝜇) from Equation 15
in Equation 14, computing the derivative of
𝑊𝐷 with respect to 𝑖, equating to zero, and
solving provides the equilibrium strategy in
the Proposition.
∎
Proposition 5. The attacker’s optimal level of
effort is given by
(16)

(11)
𝑡

𝑊𝐴 = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖) (1 − exp (− 𝜇)) 𝑏 − 𝑡.
Computing the derivative of 𝑊𝐴 with respect
to 𝑡, equating to zero, and solving leads to the
expression of 𝑡 as a function of 𝑖.
∎
Proposition 3. The attacker’s level of effort is
a decreasing function in the defender’s
investment.

𝑏

𝑡 = 𝜇ln (𝛼𝜇𝑙 ).

Proof. Substituting for 𝑖 from Equation 13 in
Equation 10 leads to the result.
∎
Proposition 6. The defender should not
invest in security beyond best practices until
the potential loss reaches
(17)

1

𝑙 ∗ = 𝛼𝑣 .
0

Sokri / Deterrence in Cyberspace

Proof. To have a positive investment,
ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0 ) > 0. This is possible only if 𝛼𝑙𝑣0 >
1, which leads to the condition in the
Proposition.
∎
Proposition 7. The attacker should not exert
any effort until the potential benefit reaches
(18)

𝑏 ∗ = 𝛼𝜇𝑙.

Proof. To have a positive effort,
𝑏
𝑏
ln (𝛼𝜇𝑙) > 0. This is possible only if 𝛼𝜇𝑙 > 1
which leads to the condition in the
Proposition.
∎
Proposition 8. The defender’s optimal
security investment level is an increasing
concave function of the potential loss, 𝑙.
Proof. As shown in Equations 19 and 20, the
first derivative of 𝑖 with respect to 𝑙 is
positive and the second derivative is
negative, respectively.
𝑑𝑖(𝑙)

(19)

𝑖 ′ (𝑙) =

(20)

𝑖 ′′ (𝑙) =

𝑑𝑙

𝑑𝑙2

1

= − 𝛼𝑙2 < 0.

Consequently, 𝑖 is a concave function in 𝑙 that
increases at decreasing rate.
∎
Proposition 9. The defender’s optimal
investment spent on information security as a
fraction of potential loss 𝑙 is given by
(21)

𝑖

𝑒
𝛼𝑣0

≈

2.718
𝛼𝑣0

. It is decreasing for 𝑙 ≥

𝑙 ∗∗ with a horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0.
Proof. The first derivative of 𝑟(𝑙) with
respect to 𝑙 is
𝑑𝑟(𝑙)
1
(22) 𝑟 ′ (𝑙) = 𝑑𝑙 = 𝛼𝑙2 (1 − ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0 )).
It is straightforward to show that
𝑒
𝑒
𝑟 ′ (𝑙) = 0 for 𝑙 = 𝛼𝑣 , 𝑟 ′ (𝑙) ≥ 0, for 𝑙 ≤ 𝛼𝑣 ,
0

and 𝑟

′ (𝑙)

0

𝑒

≤ 0, for 𝑙 ≥ 𝛼𝑣 .
0

Hence, the potential loss 𝑙 that maximizes the
fraction 𝑟(𝑙) is given by
(23)

𝑒

𝑙 ∗∗ = 𝛼𝑣 ≈
0

2.718
𝛼𝑣0

.

Using the l’Hopital rule,
lim𝑙→∞ 𝑟(𝑙) = 0, which shows that 𝑟(𝑙) has a
horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0.
∎
To deal with uncertainty in the input data, a
Monte Carlo simulation could represent each
uncertain parameter as a probability
distribution.

1

= 𝛼𝑙 > 0.

𝑑2 𝑖(𝑙)

𝑙 ≤ 𝑙 ∗∗ =
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1

𝑟(𝑙) = 𝑙 = 𝛼𝑙 ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0 ).

Proof. Dividing the expression of 𝑖 in
Equation 13 by 𝑙 leads to the result.
Proposition 10. The fraction 𝑟(𝑙) is an
increasing function in the potential loss 𝑙 for

INVESTMENT IN CYBERSECURITY
AT EQUILIBRIUM
A parsimonious game-theoretical
model is used in this paper to characterize
deterrence in cyberspace. A Stackelberg game
is played to capture the strategic nature of this
interaction and provide clear insights about it.
The suggested mechanism involves disclosing
the defender’s investment information to the
potential attacker. The game’s logic and
results crucially depend on the timings of
each move. The defender moves first,
anticipates the strategic behavior of the
attacker, and decides on the security
investment. The attacker observes the
defender’s level of investment and determines
a certain effort level. By revealing the
security investment strategy, the defender
becomes able to control the attacker’s
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incentive and deter (or reduce the effort
behind) potential attacks.
Assuming an interior solution, Proposition 1
characterizes the first-order optimality
conditions for the defender and attacker
strategies. It compares, at equilibrium,
magnitude decline in expected defender loss
from extra security investment to magnitude
increase in expected attacker benefit from
extra effort. Stackelberg interaction joins their
fates.
At equilibrium, marginal reduction in
defender’s expected loss due to additional
investment precisely balances marginal
increase in the attacker’s expected benefit
attributable to additional effort. In order to
reach this decision point, the attacker as
follower must be able to measure the
magnitude of loss to the defender from a
successful cyber attack. In the Stackelberg
interaction, attacker does have a clue from
observing optimal defender security
investment, which is tied to defender
assessment of cost in the event of disruption.
Physical properties of the cyber system’s
vulnerability must also be common
knowledge.
Propositions 4 and 5 define the attacker’s
optimal level of effort and the defender’s
optimal investment, respectively. Proposition
4 relates the defender’s strategy to three
parameters:
 the inherent vulnerability 𝑣0
 the decay rate in the vulnerability
due to investment 𝛼, and
 the defender’s potential loss 𝑙.
Proposition 5 shows that the attacker’s
strategy depends on two other parameters in
addition to 𝛼 and 𝑙, namely the mean level of
effort μ (independent of system vulnerability)
and the attacker potential benefit 𝑏 from
system disruption.

The derivative of the attacker’s expected
effort 𝑡 with respect to the defender’s
investment 𝑖 in Equation 12 indicates that the
parameters 𝛼 and 𝜇 and their interaction
effect are the key factors in cyber deterrence,
that is, in sharply affecting adversaries’ attack
plans through denial. Equation 12 shows that
the higher the two parameters the more likely
the attacker is to be deterred through
additional defender investment. The
parameter 𝛼 measures the speed at which
security investment translates into a reduction
of the asset’s vulnerability to attacks. An
increase in the parameter 𝛼 for any given
level of investment will decrease the
probability that inherent vulnerability may be
exploited, lessen the probability of a
successful attack, and, therefore, result in a
reduction in the attacker’s level of effort. At
the same time, the influence of additional
investment on reducing attacker effort even
further will rise. Equation 12 also shows that
opportunistic attacks (with small 𝜇) are harder
to influence than targeted attacks (with high
𝜇). Extensive initial interest in the targeted
system leads potential attackers to be
discouraged at a steeper rate once they learn
of additional defender investment.
Propositions 6, 8 and 9 characterize the
defender’s optimal security investment level 𝑖
as a function of the potential loss 𝑙. These
propositions highlight the following key
findings:
 The defender should not invest in
security beyond best practices until the
potential loss reaches a given value;
 The optimal security investment
increases with the expected loss at a
decreasing rate;
 The optimal investment in security as
a fraction of potential loss 𝑙 has a
horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0. This
means that, for very large potential
losses, the optimal amount to spend on
information security does not keep
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pace; it is far smaller than the potential
loss.
These findings are on par with the deterrence
literature. They are particularly consistent
with the study conducted by Gordon and Loeb
(2002).
The formalism in Equations 4, 5, and 6 is
grounded theoretically such that the model
could be repeated or extended using different
probability distributions. Its underlying
mathematics is clear and conceptually based.
Variations of the probability distribution will
provide qualitatively the same findings. The
numerical values of these findings will, of
course, depend on the values of the deterrence
model parameters.
A myopic approach such as a simultaneous
game or a decision-theoretic technique would
produce different results. Under a
simultaneous game, players make single
decisions before seeing the other player’s
moves (as in the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma
[PD]) and possibly under incomplete
information about the other player’s payoff
from certain outcomes. Attackers, for
example, are not able to observe the outcome
of previous actions before responding. The
main characteristic of myopic approaches is
the non-cooperative, monotonic relationship
between defender investment level and
attacker effort. Both players rationally defect
in PD-type games. When one cost variable
increases, the other increases and vice versa;
net payoffs in equilibrium for both decline. In
this situation, attackers are never deterred, per
se, because myopic approaches lack
disclosure mechanisms. A deeper
understanding of this interaction will be
generated in future works.
CONCLUSION
Deterrence is used to prevent
unwanted actions by influencing the cost-
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benefit analysis of potential attackers. The
most common form of deterrence in
cyberspace is deterrence by denial.
Deterrence by denial sends a signal to wouldbe attackers that they will be unsuccessful. In
this defense strategy, the defender reduces the
probability of a successful attack by investing
in information security. While the credibility
of deterrence by punishment depends on
blame attribution, deterrence by denial does
not require this knowledge.
This paper used a sequential game theoretic
approach with a disclosure mechanism
(Stackelberg competition) to formulate a
deterrence strategy in cyberspace. It derived
the defender’s optimal security investment
level and the attacker’s level of effort. The
factors influencing the decision to invest in
cybersecurity were identified and discussed.
To deal with uncertainty in the input data, the
model invites parametric analysis using
Monte Carlo simulation.
Results for the equilibrium indicate that
effectiveness of the security investment (𝛼)
and the category of attack (𝜇) and their
interaction effect are the key factors in cyber
deterrence. The more effective the security
investment in reducing vulnerability and the
higher attacker initial interest in the target, the
more likely attacker is to be deterred by
additional investment. Targeted attacks
aiming at significant damage to the defender
are more manageable by security investment
than opportunistic attacks.
The defender’s optimal security investment
level (𝑖) as a function of potential loss (𝑙)
indicates that investment in cybersecurity as a
deterrence strategy will top out after the
middle part of losses. At very high levels of
loss, there is a numbing effect; optimal
investment does not change much with
additional increments of loss.
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Deterrence in the cyber domain is more
complex than in the physical field. Further
efforts should be undertaken to understand it
in order to influence potential attackers’
behaviors. Examples of such studies include
(but are not limited to)
 application of the model to a realworld cyber-security problem using
real-life parameters,
 analyzing the interaction between
defenders and attackers in dynamic
scenarios,
 assessing the risk to the defender of a
disclosure strategy,
 including deception mechanisms to
enhance security,
 developing models to deal with
bounded rationality of human
adversaries,
 combining game theoretic models
such as this Stackelberg version with
other techniques and tools to make the
formalism more realistic and tractable;
techniques may include numerical
simulation and genetic algorithms;
tools may consist of firewalls and antivirus software.

Managers. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-100.
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Technological advances in artificial
intelligence (AI) by the United States, China
and Russia jeopardize the longstanding
nuclear peace that the world has enjoyed since
the end of the Cold War.1 The desire to obtain
AI capabilities for the purpose of
strengthening defense and security postures
could spur a new arms race among these
powerful nuclear states, and the United States,
China, and Russia have all expressed their
interest in extensive AI research and in the
implementation of AI in their nuclear
operations. The application of AI in the
nuclear operations of a superpower risks
undermining the world’s relatively stable
nuclear infrastructure, as AI could essentially
make a nuclear war “winnable” for the power
that can harness its benefits first.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly,
the likely asymmetric acquisition of AIenhanced technology will introduce a new
degree of uncertainty as these great-power
states incorporate it into their nuclear systems.
As this uncertainty escalates, nuclear crisis
stability may experience severe adverse
effects, increasing the chances of a hostile
nuclear strike.
This study examines the probable impacts of
the asymmetric acquisition of AI-capabilities
Second Lieutenant Marshall Foster (USAFA ’20) is
pursuing his master’s degree at Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
1

on nuclear crises stability by defining relevant
terms, reviewing relevant existing literature
and relevant historical cases, forecasting how
asymmetry will affect stability, and
formulating a methodology to predict how
asymmetry may arise in the future.
Ultimately, it concludes that the likely
forthcoming asymmetry will decrease nuclear
crisis stability. In response, the United States
and the international community should
engage in methods to limit the likelihood of
great-power states seizing advantages that AI
may provide for their nuclear capabilities.
These methods include pushing for
transparency, intelligence gathering, and arms
control.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
RELEVANT DEFINITIONS
Future Impacts of AI
Michael Horowitz’s analysis of
possible first-mover advantages following AI
development has set the stage for research in
this field. Horowitz aims to answer the
question, “What will advances in artificial
intelligence mean for international
competition and the balance of power?”
(Horowitz, 2018: 37). He evaluates how
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developing AI capabilities will influence
military power and international relations
while stressing that AI is more than a
technology within itself. Rather, AI is an
enabler like electricity or a combustion
engine. Answering his original question,
Horowitz provides two possible answers.
First, “key drivers of AI development in the
private sector could cause the rapid diffusion
of military applications of AI, limiting firstmover advantages for innovators” (Ibid.: 37).
On the other hand, Horowitz recognizes that
the application of AI to military uses may be
more difficult than many expect and therefore
may provide substantial first-mover
advantages for global powers. When
comparing these two possibilities, he asserts
that diffusion of AI would lower the
likelihood of a first-mover advantage, but
military AI may be more “excludable” than
civilian uses of AI and may generate more
first-mover advantages.
Since there is high-cost, up-front research and
development for acquiring AI systems that
will enable rapid power projection, Horowitz
tends to believe that AI will indeed produce
significant first-mover military advantages
despite private sector diffusions. He states
that the integration of AI into early-warning
systems and its ability to aid in rapid targeting
could also affect crisis stability and nuclear
weapons, but he conspicuously does not
elaborate on the topic. Recognizing these
advantages helps predict outcomes when
comparing the asymmetrical abilities of
competing states.
Elaborating on the ideas that Horowitz
presented, Elsa Kania believes that AI
“should be recognized as a strategic
technology with implications for national
competitiveness that extend well beyond the
military domain” (Kania, 2018: 11). States
may apply it to a wide range of objectives,
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including military, economic, and educational
programing. As a policy response, Kania
suggests that great-power states seek
opportunities to cooperate on AI issues and to
prevent escalation of AI warfare. For
instance, the United Nations Group of
Governmental Experts provides one means of
accomplishing this goal. The working group
brings together over twenty states to engage
in conversations regarding state behavior in
cyberspace as it enables “vital discussions of
core concepts and questions, particularly
ethical issues and human control, and
hopefully can create a critical foundation for
future engagement” (Kania, 2018: 18).
Separately from the intersection of the two
technologies, Kania provides an analogy
between the rise of AI and that of nuclear
weapons. The advent of nuclear weapons
posed a similar threat to strategic stability,
and during the height of the Cold War and
following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
nuclear weapons states discussed shared
concerns and aversions. Kania believes that
similar cooperation and discussion regarding
pragmatic measures aimed at risk reduction
will be equally beneficial. However, due to
the ambiguity concerning formalized
definitions of AI and the wide range of AI
capabilities, cooperation in this realm may be
even more difficult than that for nuclear
weapons, and this will require a greater
degree of transparency regarding intent and
capabilities.
Adding to the conversation, James Johnson
discusses the deterministic and dramatic
potential effects, from the tactical to the
strategic level, that AI will have on military
power, strategy, and the global balance. He
argues that if “left unchecked, the
uncertainties and vulnerabilities created by
the rapid proliferation and diffusion of AI
could become a major potential source of
instability and great power strategic rivalry”
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(Johnson, 2019: 148). This is similar to
Horowitz’s thesis, but Johnson focuses on
managing escalation and unique risks of AI
rather than first-mover advantages.

states. One country might improve its missile
defense capabilities, but an adversary might
produce a new nuclear missile with improved
agility and speed.

Specifically related to nuclear deterrence,
Johnson discusses the integration of AI into
early-warning systems. This application may
accelerate the decision-making process and
the stages of the escalation ladder to employ a
nuclear attack. In addition, “a state could
deploy long-range, offensive conventional
missile salvos enhanced by big data analytics,
cyber capabilities, and AI-augmented
autonomous weapons, and then use its missile
defenses to mop-up an adversary’s remaining
retaliatory capabilities” (Ibid.: 152).

This present balance upholds stability
between states, as there cannot likely be a
clear winner in a nuclear exchange.
Unfortunately, as O’Hanlon argues, the
application of AI to military systems
undermines this stability for a number of
reasons. First, “it seems implausible that arms
control agreements [regarding AI] would
prevent the development and deployment
of… autonomous systems” (O’Hanlon, 2018:
8). States would feel powerful incentives to
produce autonomous systems because the
mere possibility of another state
accomplishing this feat first would place the
first at a severe disadvantage.

Both of these scenarios could have a negative
impact on nuclear crisis stability as they
provide conditions that could offer advantages
for a state to strike first against an adversary.
Furthermore, Johnson holds that states may
soon develop AI-augmented weapons
systems. These systems, along with AIenabled early-warning systems and sensors,
“could adversely impact the international
security and, potentially, crisis stability at a
nuclear level of warfare” (Ibid.: 159).
Finally, utilizing scenarios regarding
aggression between Russia and NATO,
Michael O’Hanlon (2018) illustrates how AI
will alter the future of warfare. He discusses
the potential for escalation following possible
Russian attacks on the Baltic States, which
ranges from minimal ground conflicts to
nuclear warfare. While O’Hanlon believes
there are appropriate measures in place,
coming from both NATO and Russian
deterrence policies, that will prevent
escalation to war on a nuclear level, the
introduction of AI could seriously damage
this crisis stability. According to O’Hanlon,
there is currently a relative balance of tactical
[sic] capabilities between nuclear weapons

Second, at present, there is no clear response
to an attack made with AI. This dilemma
mirrors the cyber realm since an attack that
utilizes AI or cyber can come in many
different forms and degrees of severity,
rendering it difficult for a state to formulate a
response that is appropriate and that does not
escalate the conflict. Finally, “the degree of
difficulty [of winning a war with AI] would
be quite considerable and the degree of
escalatory risk highly unsettling” (Ibid.: 21).
Again, like cyber warfare, AI introduces a
high level of ambiguity to conflict since it is
not clear what an AI attack will look like or
the form it will take.
Stephen Cimbala (2012) presents an argument
that is in line with O’Hanlon’s. Cimbala holds
that the uncertainty that AI will bring to the
battlefield will undermine stability. Overall,
O’Hanlon’s various scenarios revolving
around the implementation of AI into military
systems effectively demonstrate how AI will
affect conflict at the tactical level and how
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these tactical repercussions alter strategic
stability.
The Likely Asymmetric Acquisition of
Capabilities
In addition to projecting the impacts
of AI, Kania (2018) provides analysis on how
the U.S., China, and Russia have embarked on
an AI arms race. There is ongoing military
competition between these states as they
attempt to advance their AI capabilities, and
the United States is arguably but likely the
current leader. However, China is prioritizing
military innovation and actively seeking a
wide range of defense applications of AI,
placing them as a close second to the United
States in this competition. Additionally,
Russia’s pursuits in the same realm are
advancing at a rapid pace. Kania’s underlying
argument lies in the idea that the term “arms
race” is too simplistic to capture the strategic
consequences of the AI revolution.
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is at stake, because we don’t know what sort
of thing AI will turn out to be” (Pecotic,
2019: 3). Nonetheless, there will be
advantages following the acquisition of AI
capabilities, and they may take the form of
autonomous drones, more efficient supply
changes, or autonomous nuclear missiles.
Additionally, just as Kania predicted, Pecotic
believes that advances in AI may resemble the
nuclear weapons buildup of the Cold War. He
suggests that the main competition will be
between the United States and China and does
not have the same solution for the situation as
Kania provided. Pecotic holds that “once
China or the United States is confident in a
stable lead [in AI], they will have few
incentives to compromise or share
technology” (Ibid.: 22).

Supporting this claim and building upon
Horowitz, Kania states that AI is not a
weapon in itself. Rather, AI is a utility that
states can utilize to enhance their existing
military capabilities. In this sense, AI is more
synonymous with electricity or the steam
engine than a specific weapons system since it
is only useful due to its applications. States
cannot launch AI at another state, but they can
employ autonomous planes, self-guided
nuclear missiles, or various other weapons
systems with AI.

Defining Crisis Stability
A significant number of scholars and
practitioners have spent time defining crisis
stability. This study will focus on the
definition presented by Thomas Schelling,
which has prevailed throughout the evolution
of nuclear deterrence literature. As Schelling
famously stated, “the reciprocal fear of
surprise attack” may drive states to launch a
presumptive strike. In this case, “fear that the
other may be about to strike in the mistaken
belief that [one side is] about to strike gives
[this side] a motive for striking, and so
justifies the other’s motive” (Schelling, 1958:
1).

Like Kania, Adrian Pecotic (2019) addresses
the apparent race for AI between the United
States, Russia, and China. However, instead
of calling for global cooperation and dialogue
as Kania did, Pecotic focuses on different
approaches to AI implementation and claims
that whichever state successfully incorporates
AI into their military systems will secure
significant military advantages. He admits
that “it’s tough to tell what sort of advantage

This scenario describes the essence of crisis
stability, which exists when neither side feels
the pressure to strike the other out of fear that
the other is about to strike. Furthermore, the
acquisition of new offensive capabilities
threatens crisis stability. As Robert Jervis
describes, under circumstances in which a
state fears an adversarial attack, “the state's
efforts to deter the adversary or protect itself
in case of war would make war more likely.
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Observing the state's preparations, the
adversary would see the danger of war
increasing and would itself make ready to
strike” (Jervis, 1993: 242).
The introduction of AI into nuclear systems
may create the circumstances Jervis describes.
As the literature from Horowitz, Kania, and
others has demonstrated, AI is a technology
enhancer that possesses unknown potential
and is clouded with uncertainty. It will be
very difficult for states to predict how others
will utilize AI, how they will rely on AI, and
how they will program their automated
machines. Altogether, AI will introduce many
unknowns in a state’s calculations when
predicting an adversarial attack. This
uncertainty may create situations in which
crisis stability diminishes.

First, the Soviet acquisition of ICBMs during
the Cold War and the ensuing American
“window of vulnerability” mirror the possible
advent of AI in nuclear weapons systems.
According to Cold War deterrence scholars
Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, “By the end
of the 1960s, the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces had deployed enough ICBMs to
destroy about half of the population and
industry of the United States. It had achieved
the capability that McNamara considered
essential for MAD [mutually assured
destruction]. Sometime in the 1970s the
Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity”
(Lebow and Stein, 1995: 173).

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

In response, the United States pursued a path
to build up their stockpile of ICBMs and
embark in counterforce doctrine (Johnson,
1983). This period marked uncertainty for the
United States, just as the implementation of
AI will do for any adversary. However, the
Soviet advantage did not drive the United
States to attack the Soviet Union or develop a
new technology that would counteract the
ICBMs, which would be in line with the
hypothesis of this study. Instead, the United
States embarked on a new strategy and aimed
to reinstate a balance of power. Nonetheless,
AI will introduce a level of uncertainty that
ICBMs did not, meaning the two technologies
may not create similar environments
following their introduction to a state’s
nuclear weapons complex.

Three specific historical cases can
help predict the effects of the onset of AI in
nuclear weapons systems. These cases reflect
the introduction of new technologies and
strategies that risked nuclear escalation but in
which great power states managed to prevent
conflict. The lessons learned from each case
will be useful in formulating predictions, but
it is important to note that AI will bring
extreme uncertainty that previous changes in
nuclear deterrence have not.

Secondly, President Reagan’s counterforce
strategies along with the American advantage
in surveillance techniques during the Cold
War provide another case study to help
predict the effects of AI on deterrence.
Counterforce strategies offer a unique
asymmetry between adversaries, as “one
effect of counterforce strategies… is that they
provide a rational motive for waging a
conventional war even when one expects to
lose” (Wagner, 1991: 748). At the same time,

As Glenn Kent and David Thaler describe,
crisis instability is the “condition that exists
when either leader feels pressure because of
emotion, uncertainty, miscalculation,
misperception, or the posture of forces to
strike first to avoid the worse consequence of
incurring a first strike” (Kent and Thaler,
1989: xviii). Therefore, the uncertainty and
probability of miscalculation that comes with
the introduction of AI to nuclear systems
would likely increase crisis instability
between states.
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according to Austin Long and Brendan
Rittenhouse Green (2014), the United States
had a significant advantage over the Soviet
Union in the realm of intelligence and
surveillance regarding nuclear weapons. This
came in the forms of ocean surveillance
technology for submarines, SIGINT, and
Rapidly Deployable Surveillance System
units. Altogether, these American advantages
along with U.S. counterforce strategy
demonstrate a path that adversaries may
pursue in order to maximize the costs of
waging war against them.
As Wagner (1991) described, counterforce is
useful even when a state is losing, so it is a
useful deterrent against an adversary. This
case represents how adversaries may react if
another acquires AI capabilities. Rather than
purely pursuing the same route as an
adversary, another may alter their strategy or
develop a technology that helps counter
others.
Finally, veering away from nuclear
deterrence, the American and Chinese
acquisition of space capabilities surrounding
the turn of the century offers another
comparison to the future mutual acquisition of
AI capabilities. Following China’s milestone
as it became the third country to launch a
person into space in 2003, the United States
had a clear choice to make: “America could
reach out to cooperate, proposing joint space
exploration projects, or it could restrict
collaboration and perhaps even decide to
pursue a space race akin to the 1960s
competition against the Soviet Union”
(Moskowitz, 2011).
Out of fear, the United States resisted
cooperation. It believed that collaboration
would provide a greater technological benefit
to China and would create a large risk for the
United States. However, Clara Moskowitz
(2011) recommends that the United States
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should view space as only one aspect in the
overall U.S.-China relationship. Instead of
comparing advantages solely in the context of
space, Americans should see collaboration as
a way to strengthen ties, increase cooperation
in other fields, and maintain stability between
the two countries.
Similar to the previous case studies, the
Chinese acquisition of space capabilities did
not lead to acts of aggression. Altogether, the
three cases do not point to the likelihood of
AI leading to a breaking point in crisis
stability between the United States and China
or the United States and Russia. However, as
the rest of this study will conclude, AI will
introduce more technological and strategic
uncertainty than past technologies.
When the Soviet Union developed ICBMs or
the Chinese put a person in space, the United
States understood the technology, but an
ICBM or another feat that the United States
had previously accomplished is significantly
easier to evaluate than AI capabilities. Rather,
AI may appear in a variety of realms as it is
not a technology within itself, like Horowitz
and Kania remind us. AI is an enabler that
will introduce indefinite amounts of
uncertainty between adversaries and become
far more dangerous to crisis stability than the
technologies presented in these case studies.
OPERATIONALIZATION
In order to predict the impact of
asymmetric acquisition of AI capabilities
through a systematic method, this paper will
utilize a series of tables that register possible
advantages within the varying uses of AI in
nuclear systems for different states. Rather
than simply recognizing that there may be
qualitative variances regarding how states
implement AI, this method illustrates the
degree to which different capabilities will
impact crisis stability. Although there are a
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variety of techniques for which a state may
incorporate AI into its numerous nuclear
systems, this system of operationalization will
focus on five primary, general, and likely uses
of AI: (1) unmanned nuclear delivery
systems, (2) nuclear early warning systems,
(3) command and control, (4) data processing,
and (5) nuclear weapons countermeasures.
This is not to say that there are no other
possible applications of AI for nuclear
systems, simply that these capabilities provide
areas in which major-power states may
acquire distinct advantages. The methodology
will utilize the five categories as examples for
how acquisition of varying proficiencies
produces asymmetry and ultimately harms
nuclear crisis stability.
In order to compare capabilities between two
states, it is beneficial to focus on a state’s
advantage through AI-enhancement and its
reliance upon AI for each category. Simply
prioritizing the possession of an AI-enhanced
capability neglects the asymmetry that may
arise from variances in how states utilize AIsystems. For example, if a state utilizes AI to
assist its early warning systems while another
relies on AI in its early warning systems to
make final decisions (without a human in the
loop), the latter has a much stronger reliance
upon AI. Similarly, if both states possess AIenhanced nuclear weapons countermeasures,
one may possess an extremely reliable system
while the other’s system may be faulty or
incomplete. In this case, one state has a
distinctive advantage over the other regarding
countermeasures. Therefore, some
consideration of reliance and consequent
advantage provides a better reference for
measuring asymmetry than pure possession of
the technology.
When addressing the total degree of
asymmetry that varying capabilities produce,
it is important to note that some capabilities
have greater weight than others. For instance,

the utilization of AI-enhanced unmanned
delivery vehicles may worry an adversary
more than the possession of AI-enhanced data
processing systems. Consequently, when
measuring asymmetry, or perceived
asymmetry, it is useful to weigh delivery
vehicles as providing greater advantage than
data processing abilities.
In order to combine these factors, the
presence of advantages and their respective
weights, Table 1, below, presents a method of
predicting asymmetry between states. In this
table, the advantages of both states regarding
varying capabilities are registered for each
category, with “1” representing an advantage
while “0” represents the lack thereof. If both
states record a “0,” then neither state holds a
distinct advantage over the other in the
respective category. The numbers recorded as
“weights of capability” represent the impact
that the presence of an advantage in the
specific category will have on the total
asymmetry in the overall relationship. Finally,
if there is a presence of an advantage, that
category will produce a score of asymmetry
equal to its assigned weight. The overall table
output will be the sum of each capability’s
recorded score of asymmetry.
As opposed to presenting an argument for
which state will possess future advantage in
each category and how each category should
be weighted exactly, this study merely
proposes predictions for the purpose of
demonstrating the likely increases in
asymmetry. These guesses show how
acquisitions of varying capabilities may
populate this table following how states
incorporate AI into their nuclear weapons
systems. In this sense, Tables 2-3, below,
demonstrate a methodology or tool for
predicting asymmetry. Using placeholder
values for how the United States, China, and
Russia will acquire AI, the tables indicate
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possible asymmetry that may arise between
these major-power states.
The hypothetical relationship between the
United States and Russia (in Table 3) scored a
7 while that of the United States and China (in
Table 2) scored an 8. When compared next to
each other, these values do not have any
significance because neither the category
advantages nor the weights are tied to a
consistent interval level of measurement. The
fact that China’s score is higher than Russia’s
does not mean that there is more asymmetry
in that relationship.
Rather, these values have significance when
compared to other values from the same
tables when the inputs change. That is,
longitudinal changes (over time) in table
output are more meaningful than cross-dyad
differences in any single year. The various
possible inputs (advantages in capabilities
along with the weights) in a specific table
dictate the overall table output.
When the U.S.-China analysis produces a
score of 8, the policy takeaway should focus
on methods to reduce the table output over
time, which could occur from the removal of
or the emergence of new advantages. A
scenario that produces higher table outputs for
the same dyad indicates higher levels of
asymmetry. The desire to decrease asymmetry
would entail efforts to minimize the table
outputs so that they approach zero in every
category of capability.
Consequences
As this method of predicting
asymmetry between the selected major-power
states demonstrates, qualitative variance in
acquiring AI-enhanced nuclear weapons will
increase asymmetry within these
relationships. This asymmetry will
undoubtedly increase the uncertainty of these
states when analyzing the capabilities of an
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adversary due to the fact that AI is a format of
technology, a kind of utility that contains a
wide array of unknown variables. A state may
be uncertain of how an adversary’s AI
systems function, the degree to which they
rely on AI in these systems, the decisionmaking autonomy given to the system, etc.
Referring to Kent and Thaler’s definition of
nuclear crisis stability, that “crisis instability
is the condition that exists when either leader
feels pressure because of emotion,
uncertainty, miscalculation, misperception, or
the posture of forces to strike first to avoid the
worse consequence of incurring a first strike,”
this increase of uncertainty from AI
asymmetry will negatively affect nuclear
crisis stability. It follows that as asymmetry
increases (or the table outputs presented
increase,) the degree of uncertainty will
increase, and nuclear crisis stability will
continuously decrease.
Counterarguments
After reviewing the case studies
presented in this study, it may not seem as if
asymmetry truly effects crisis stability to the
point that an actor will utilize a preemptive
strike. In the historical cases of Soviet
acquisition of ICBM’s, the American
employment of counterforce strategies, and
the Chinese rise in space power, no state
chose to strike its adversary. These results
would lead to the conclusion that asymmetric
acquisition of capabilities does not
significantly diminish nuclear crisis stability.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, great
powers have always found a way to avoid
worst case scenarios that might be brought
about from rapid technological change.
However, AI provides more uncertainty
regarding intention and capabilities than the
technologies presented in the old case studies.
For example, when the Soviet Union acquired
ICBMs, the United States recognized what
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this meant for their security posture. It was
clear what advantage this weapon system
provided the Soviets, so the level of
uncertainty was relatively low.

the United States to know which capabilities
its adversaries are developing, and increase its
ability to counter, to stay on par with those
adversaries.

In the case of AI, as previously mentioned,
states will struggle to determine how states
will be able to utilize autonomous systems.
Intentions, capabilities, and reliance will all
be indeterminate without transparency from
great power states that acquire AI. For this
reason, AI introduces a new level of
uncertainty regarding capabilities that is
unprecedented and may have unique effects
on nuclear crisis stability. More specifically,
the uncertainty surrounding AI-enhanced
systems will decrease nuclear crisis stability
in a way that previously existing technologies
have not.

Finally, and most importantly, the United
States and the international community could
work to place controls and regulations on the
incorporation of AI in nuclear weapons
systems in a bid to maintain transparency.
This final step would decrease the number of
areas in which states could develop AIsystems and therefore reduce the chances that
a state might achieve an advantage over the
United States. Altogether, these prudent steps
would limit asymmetry between major-power
states, prevent uncertainty regarding
adversarial AI-enhanced nuclear systems, and
ultimately help maintain nuclear crisis
stability.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
To reiterate, the method presented in
this study demonstrates how crisis stability
will decrease as great-power states
asymmetrically acquire AI-enhanced
technologies and incorporate them—in
qualitatively different ways—into their
nuclear weapons systems. For policy, this
introduces the desire to limit asymmetry
between major-power states.
In order for the United States to achieve this
goal and preserve nuclear crisis stability, it
could pursue three distinct actions. First, it
might enhance its intelligence gathering
methods that allow it to better understand
adversaries’ intentions and capabilities
regarding AI-enhanced systems. By doing so,
the United States will increase its ability to
accurately predict AI paths of its adversaries.
The United States should then aim to limit
asymmetry between itself and adversaries by
increasing its own capabilities in the same
areas as adversaries. Using strengthened
intelligence from the first step would allow
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Table 1: Example

Table Output (Sum of Asymmetry Created): 1.5

Table 2: U.S.-China

Table Output: 8
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Table 3: U.S.-Russia

Table Output: 7
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Since the end of the Second World
War the United States has practiced extended
deterrence as a means of resisting Russian
expansion and aggression.1 In Europe, the US
has done this with the support of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. After the fall of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, NATO shifted its focus away from
Russia and grew to include several states
which had once been part of the USSR;
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, it
was not until after conflict broke out in
Ukraine in 2014, and Russia re-emerged as a
threat that the alliance was forced to seriously
consider defending the Baltics.
For several years, NATO has concentrated its
efforts almost exclusively on the structure and
placement of military forces with hopes of rebuilding its once-strong deterrence posture in
Europe. The modern, non-kinetic threat to the
Baltic Three, however, demands more
nuanced solutions which transcend the
military sphere. For this reason, the United
States and its NATO allies must focus more
of their efforts in Northeastern Europe on
resilience rather than traditional deterrence. A
strategy of resilience in the Baltics must
include efforts to counter propaganda and
Second Lieutenant Liam Connolly (USAFA ’19) is
completing his pilot training.
2
Schuyler Foerster, ed., American Defense Policy, 6th
edition. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1990).
1

information warfare, build societal cohesion
and assimilate Russian-speaking people, and
reinforce cyber security in both the private
and public sectors. Altogether, these lines of
effort will deny the Kremlin the ability to
achieve political and strategic goals in the
Baltics.
EXTENDED DETERRENCE VERSUS
RESILIENCE
Extended deterrence is the concept in
which one state guarantees that it will use its
military forces not only for its own defense,
but also for the defense of its allies. This is
done with the intent to persuade a third-party
mutual adversary to maintain the status quo in
a conflict.2 Regardless of the domain,
deterrence, at its core, consists of two
elements: capabilities and credibility.
Deterrence is only functional when these
elements come together and capabilities are
matched with an actual willingness to employ
such capabilities.
Signaling “will” is critical when it comes to
proving the resolve and legitimacy of an
alliance which includes an extended
deterrence agreement.3 The United States has
Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser, “Signaling
Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in
Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of
Political Science 58, no. 4 (October 2014): 919–935.
3
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long struggled with figuring out how exactly
to signal to adversaries its true willingness to
employ military forces and risk personal
harm, or even survival, for the sake of another
state’s security. Signals which are too strong
run the risk of escalating the conflict to a
point which is too costly for either side.
This was the case in October 1969 when
President Richard Nixon ordered the
“Madman Nuclear Alert” and heightened the
readiness of US strategic forces in hopes of
bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table in
Vietnam.4 Soviet leadership, however, was
unsure how to interpret the message and
experts conclude that the alert represented a
serious miscalculation on behalf of US
leadership and was ultimately detrimental to
stability.5
On the other hand, weaker signals may
embolden the adversary. In his landmark
work, Arms and Influence, political scientist
Thomas Schelling explained the dangers
associated with allowing an adversary to
slowly push the limits of a security
commitment with tactics that meet, but do not
cross, the threshold for retaliation.
Schelling coined the term “salami tactics” to
describe such activities and argued that, over
time, the threshold for retaliation will be
forced to rise and the adversary will earn
greater freedom to exercise its will.6
In the nuclear domain, extended deterrence
works to prevent nuclear-capable adversaries
from striking allies and partners who lack
Scott Sagan and Jeremi Suri, “The Madman Nuclear
Alert,” The MIT Press 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 150–
183.
5
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6
Thomas C. Schelling, “The Art of Commitment,” in
Arms and Influence (New haven: Yale University
Press, 1966).
7
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence,
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983).
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such capabilities. Nuclear deterrence is
closely linked with punishment, or the threat
of using strategic weapons to eliminate
significant portions of an adversary’s civilian
population and infrastructure.7
Extended nuclear deterrence also works as a
means of preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. States have no need to
pursue their own nuclear program if they feel
assured by an ally’s capabilities. For decades,
the United States’ nuclear umbrella has
applied to each of its NATO allies and has
expanded as the alliance has stretched
eastward towards Russia. NATO’s 2010
Strategic Concept explicitly states that, “[t]he
supreme guarantee of the security of the
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of
the United States.”8 Simply put, the United
States’ nuclear capabilities stand as the
bedrock of NATO members’ national
security.
Much like nuclear capabilities, conventional
forces also play an essential role in efforts to
deter an adversary. Conventional deterrence,
however, tends to be more closely associated
with denial, or simply, “convincing an
opponent that he will not attain his goals on
the battlefield.”9 Today, NATO members
contribute troops and resources to
conventional land, air, and sea forces, some of
which are forward staged on the alliance’s
eastern flank.10 Given NATO’s strictly
defensive posture, these forces and their
capabilities are meant to influence Russian
NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization” (NATO Public Diplomacy Division,
November 20, 2010).
9
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence.
10
David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing
Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank (RAND
Corporation, 2016).
8
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leaders’ calculus should they consider hostile
military intervention within the borders of the
alliance.
In the 21st Century, extended deterrence is
not strictly limited to the conventional and
nuclear domains. A truly effective modern
deterrence posture incorporates the full
spectrum of warfighting domains to make
clear to the adversary that any act of
aggression would prove to be too costly in the
long term. US Air Force General John E.
Hyten, the current Commander of
USSTRATCOM, underscored the reality of
this dynamic when he said the following:
The components of our nuclear triad
have always been and will continue to
be the backbone of our nation’s
deterrent force. That is where
deterrence starts. But today it’s more
than just nuclear. It requires the
integration of all our capabilities…11
Deterrence theory was largely born out of the
Cold War’s bi-polar balance of power which
rested on the strength of conventional and
nuclear forces, but the dissolution of the
Soviet Union has forced a dramatic shift in
the global security environment. Adversaries
have rapidly worked to gain an asymmetric
edge given the United States’ and its allies’
sizeable conventional advantage.12
In turn, warfighting domains which exist
beyond the conventional and nuclear spheres
have become increasingly relevant in recent
years. Most notably, states and non-state
actors alike have begun working to exploit the
General John E. Hyten, “2017 Deterrence
Symposium Opening Remarks” (Omaha, Nebraska,
July 26, 2017).
12
Herbert Lin and Jackie Kerr, “On Cyber-Enabled
Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation,”
SSRN (August 13, 2017).
11

harmful, even militant potential of space and
cyberspace. Beyond that, some countries,
namely Russia, have incorporated “soft”,
traditionally non-military tools into military
doctrine for achieving political and strategic
goals.13 Rather than existing in separate
spheres, economic, diplomatic, and
informational tactics are now central to
modern warfare. This full spectrum approach
to conflict poses a challenge to traditional
deterrence theory as leaders today are forced
to consider how to address threats and acts of
aggression which do not meet the threshold
for a violent, military response.
Relative to extended deterrence and
traditional methods of maintaining the status
quo, resilience offers a more nuanced
approach to meeting these modern security
challenges. As explained by Dr. Guillaume
Lasconjarias of the NATO Defense College,
deterrence focuses primarily on the military
sphere, whereas a strategy of resilience takes
a “whole-of-society approach” to reducing a
nation’s vulnerability to 21st Century threats
such as information warfare and cyberattacks.14
Rather than preventing attacks before they
take place, resilience ensures that the acts of
aggression are unable to achieve the effects
desired by the adversary. As members of the
transatlantic political community, NATO
member states pride themselves on fostering
free and open societies. Unfortunately, this
makes the world’s most robust military

Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and
Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows,
February 27, 2013.
14
Guillaume Lasconjarias, Deterrence through
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Being Prepared, Eisenhower Papers (Rome: Research
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alliance exceptionally weak with regards to
these threats.15
In practice, resilience includes a wide array of
potential endeavors, which range from
improving education, building societal
cohesion, and strengthening law enforcement
among other things.16 Because the focus is
internal, each state’s approach to resilience is
likely to be unique. However, regardless of the
means taken to achieve it, the ultimate goal is to
enhance a nation’s capacity to withstand
prolonged pressure and aggression. To be clear,
resilience is not a complete alternative to
deterrence but rather a means of reinforcing and
supplementing deterrence. Given the challenges
and threats currently facing NATO in the Baltics,

it is worthwhile to consider a shift in focus
from deterrence to resilience in this specific
corner of the alliance.
THE THREAT TO THE BALTIC THREE
In 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
were welcomed into NATO as full members,
and thus became beneficiaries of the
alliance’s collective defense agreement.17
Likewise, the former Soviet republics also
took their place under the shield of the US
nuclear umbrella.
The Baltic States represent the eastern-most
edge of the alliance and the farthest that
NATO has reached into the Russian sphere of
influence.
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the Russian Empire ruled what is now
modern-day Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.18
The Russian Revolution granted the Baltics a
brief period of independence, but Soviet
occupation took hold in 1940 as Europe
nosedived towards the Second World War.19
Across the Soviet era, the Baltic States stood
as part of the geographic “buffer” between
Russia and the West.
Following WWII, the communist regime in
Moscow implemented so-called Russification
policies across the USSR in hopes of,
“sovietizing the non-Russian population.”20
Ethnic Russians proliferated throughout the
Soviet republics and along with them came
Russian language and culture.21 As a result,
over the course of fifty years of Soviet
occupation the ethnic composition of the
Baltic States was dramatically altered.
Today, in Lithuania, 5.8% of the overall
population is ethnically Russian while 8%
speak Russian as their primary language.22 In
comparison, 24.8% of Estonians are
ethnically Russian and 29.6% speak Russian
as their primary language.23 In Latvia, the
state most severely impacted by Russification
in the Baltics, 25.6% of the population is
ethnically Russian while 33% of citizens
identify Russian as their primary language.24
In 2014 the Putin regime asserted that Russia
has an obligation to “protect” ethnic Russians

The Baltics’ relationship with Russia dates
back to the 18th century and the times when
15
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and Russian-speaking people everywhere.25
Russia, in turn, relied on this claim to justify
the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as
well as their support for the bloody separatist
movement in Eastern Ukraine.26 Coupled with
the history of the Baltics’ relationship with
Russia, this policy strongly implies that
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are logical
targets of Russian belligerence.
Already, the Baltic States have found
themselves victims of low-level, non-violent
Russian aggression.27 In 2007, cyber
infrastructure in Estonia was struck with
massive “distributed denial of service”
(DDOS) attacks after the Estonian
government decided to move a Soviet war
memorial outside the center of the country’s
capital city, Tallinn.28 Although there has
been no definitive proof that the attacks were
ordered or carried out about by the Russian
government, Estonian investigators claim to
have traced the attacks back to internet users
in Russia.
Likewise, Lithuania claims that between 2015
and 2016 the Kremlin was responsible for a
wave of cyber-attacks against government
systems.29 More recently, in August of 2017
the Kurzeme region of Latvia experienced a
widespread cell-service outage. A Russian
ship equipped with electronic warfare
capabilities was coincidentally located off
Latvia’s coast at the time of the outage, and
“Transcript: Putin Says Russia Will Protect the
Rights of Russians Abroad,” The Washington Post,
March 18, 2014, sec. World.
26
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27
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Corportation, 2017).
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29
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the country’s intelligence services strongly
suspected a connection.30 These alleged
attacks are consistent with what many
officials in the Baltic countries say has been
taking place consistently in the region for
decades now since the Soviet Union
disintegrated.31
Russia is also guilty of relying on statebacked media platforms and nongovernmental organizations to deliver skewed
news and information to Russian speaking
populations in the Baltic States.32 The Russian
government’s “Compatriots Policy” functions
as an arm of the state propaganda machine by
linking pro-Russia organizations in the Baltics
with necessary funding and resources.33
Furthermore, Russian media outlets in the
Baltics have become known for expressing
anti-Western messages and tend to draw
viewers in with higher production quality
relative to local media outlets, which
communicate in languages other than
Russian.34 Estonia’s 2013 Internal Security
Service Annual Report asserts that Russian
influence operations in the country focus
primarily on claims that, “Estonia supports
Nazism; Russian-speaking people are
discriminated against in Estonia en masse;
[and] Estonia is a dead-end state that only
causes problems for its Western partners.”35
Latvia and Lithuania have also been targets of
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claims that the government enforces “fascist”
policies.36

political and strategic goals in the aftermath
of the Arab Spring.

These examples represent elements of a larger
influence campaign adapted to the 21st
century information environment and geared
towards fracturing ethnic populations in the
Baltics while also cultivating general
dissatisfaction with the state.

Initial analysis of the speech focused on the
idea that non-kinetic activities such as those
seen in the Baltics are a prelude to war. In
other words, these activities are the Kremlin’s
way of “stirring up the battlefield” before
really engaging in conflict. In a more recent
analysis of the speech, however, Galeotti
writes, “[t]he point is this: If the subversion is
not the prelude to war, but the war itself, this
changes our understanding of the threat…”38

To be clear, these instances alone do not offer
concrete proof of an impending Russian
offensive with real, kinetic effects. Because
Russian aggression in the Baltics thus far has
been non-violent and mostly non-attributable,
it is evident that they remain wary of the
potentially staggering consequences
associated with a conventional war between
themselves and NATO for the sake of three
states whose people have already soundly
rejected Kremlin rule twice in the past
century. Somewhere there exists a threshold
at which point Russia’s provocative actions
will be met with retaliation. To operate
beneath this threshold and to continue to
apply non-kinetic tools with the hope of
reigning Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia back
into its personal sphere of influence is
Russia’s goal.
In order to understand this, much can be
learned from the words of Russian leaders
themselves. Mark Galeotti, a senior research
fellow at the Institute of International Affairs
Prague, famously published and analyzed a
2013 speech by Russian General Valery
Gerasimov.37 Galeotti coined the term
“Gerasimov Doctrine” to refer to the speech
which loosely outlined Moscow’s perspective
on the rapidly-evolving security environment
and the use of non-violent methods to achieve

36
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‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5,
2018.
37

Galeotti argues that Russia does not equate
the line between non-kinetic and kinetic
activities with the line between peace and
war. Rather, war exists on a wide spectrum
and begins with non-violent, non-kinetic
activities, which impact the adversary’s
political, economic, and psychological
condition. This analysis fits the narrative in
the Baltic States quite well.
Regardless of whether or not the conflict
becomes violent, Russian non-violent
aggression, as it stands today, poses a
legitimate threat to stability in the Baltics and
represents a serious challenge to the
sovereignty of these states. An inadequate
response from NATO gives weight to
concerns that the alliance is not as resolute as
it claims to be, and that the United States is
not, in fact, a reliable partner in terms of
security. For this reason, it is worthwhile to
consider the signals that the United States is
sending as well as the implications they have
for deterring Russia in the Baltics.
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POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The annexation of Crimea and the
onset of the Russian-backed separatist
movement in Eastern Ukraine in the spring of
2014 sent shockwaves across NATO. It had
been over two decades since Western leaders
had seriously considered the possibility of
European states being violently attacked from
the East. NATO was forced to re-discover its
Cold War-era “playbook” and begin seriously
thinking about Russia as an adversary once
again.
In June of 2014, just months after the onset of
the conflict in Ukraine, US President Barack
Obama introduced the European Reassurance
Initiative.39 The President’s proposal, later
approved by Congress, included $1 billion in
support of coalition exercises with NATO
allies, the deployment of US military
advisors, and the improvement of critical
security infrastructure in Europe. Each of
these lines of effort put special emphasis on
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland given
their history with and proximity to Russia.
This policy was a clear and swift response to
Russia’s decision to threaten peace on the
continent. It was also a recognition of the fact
that, since becoming bogged down in the
Global War on Terror and naïve to the reality
of great power competition, NATO’s force
structure and capabilities in Europe had
atrophied.
The 2016 election of President Donald Trump
gave many proponents of transatlantic
collective defense cause for concern. As a
Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET:
European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts
in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,”
Whitehouse.gov.
40
Jenna Johnson, “Trump on NATO: ‘I Said It Was
Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete.’,” The Washington
Post, April 12, 2017, sec. Post Politics.
39

candidate and president-elect, Trump openly
called into question the efficacy of NATO and
Article V several times.40 Once in office,
however, Trump’s tone changed. In 2017,
President Obama’s original policy was renamed the European Deterrence Initiative and
spending grew significantly to $3.4 billion
annually.41
Beyond that, the Trump administration’s
National Security Strategy (2017) and
Nuclear Posture Review (2018) were
exceptionally candid in framing Russia as a
legitimate, competitive adversary. Under the
sub-heading “Promote American Resilience”,
the most recent NSS asserts that, “actors such
as Russia are using information tools in an
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of
democracies.”42 This accurately describes not
just Russia’s efforts to interfere in American
elections, but also the Kremlin’s hybrid
strategy in locations such as the Baltics. Later,
the document reads, “Russia seeks to restore
its great power status and establish spheres of
influence near its borders.”43 This is a direct
reference to the annexation of Crimea and
Russia’s greater expansionary ambitions in
the former Soviet Union. These quotes reflect
the Trump administration’s realist perspective
on international affairs and a break from the
Obama administration’s optimistic outlook on
relations with Russia.
With regards to the developments in the
broader alliance, NATO heads of state and
government gathered in Wales in September
of 2014 with hopes of charting a new path
forward in the face of a renewed, looming
threat.44 Leaders agreed that the alliance
Jen Judson, “Funding to Deter Russia Reaches $6.5B
in FY19 Defense Budget Request,” Defense News.
42
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44
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needed to develop and implement an updated
deterrence posture and took steps to begin
restoring the foundations of collective defense
in Europe. Among these steps was the pledge
by each member to spend 2% of GDP on
defense, as well as the establishment of the
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF).45 The VJTF was to be brigade-sized
and capable of responding to dynamic threats
across the spectrum of warfighting domains.
NATO leaders gathered once again in
Warsaw in 2016 and laid out a series of
decisions meant to strengthen deterrence.
Chief among these decisions was the
introduction of the Enhance Forward
Presence. This initiative directed the
development and deployment of four multinational, defensive battalions in Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively.46
In Warsaw, the allies also nominally agreed to
enhance resilience. NATO’s definition for
resilience, however, was narrow in scope and
strictly related to response after an armed
attack.47
Altogether, there is no question that the
United States and NATO have made notable
progress with regards to restoring
conventional deterrence in Eastern Europe,
specifically in the Baltics. These
developments, however, have remained
almost entirely tied to the military domain and
do little to address the most pressing threats
actually facing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
Fighter jets, warships, and tanks ultimately
cannot prevent the spread of propaganda or
attacks in the cyber realm.
45
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Thinking along the lines of resiliency, NATO
must look beyond strictly the military
dimension and take a much broader approach
to denying Russia its goals in the Baltics.
There are a number of key areas in which the
United States and allies ought to invest and
turn their attention towards.
For example, media outlets associated with
the Russian state propaganda machine play a
central role in the Kremlin’s influence
strategy in the Baltics.48 Unfortunately, many
TV channels, radio stations, and digital
outlets with pro-European slants do not
broadcast or publish their work in Russian.
Those who are multi-lingual have access to a
wide variety of news sources (English,
Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian, and Russian)
and are able to see-through absurd Russian
propaganda.49 However, members of society
who, to begin with, are most vulnerable to
Russian influence are left to consume media
from pro-Kremlin sources, which also tend to
have higher production quality, thus
solidifying interest from viewers.50
Essentially, there exist separate information
spheres which are sharply divided by
language. Working to ensure that Russianspeaking people in the Baltics have access to
free and fair media will make them less
susceptible to Kremlin-generated talking
points and decrease dissatisfaction with the
state.
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US
government funded endeavor, has done work
along these lines since the Cold War and
claims to have, “played a significant role in
the collapse of communism and the rise of
democracies in post-communist Europe.”51
RFE/RL discontinued services directed
specifically for the Baltics in 2004.
Along the same lines, ensuring the
assimilation and enfranchisement of ethnic
Russians and Russian-speaking people in the
Baltics is also of great importance. This issue
most directly pertains to Latvia, the Baltic
state most heavily impacted by Russian
immigration during the Soviet era. According
to the European Network on Statelessness,
roughly 230,000 people currently living in
Latvia (about 12% of the total population) fall
under the classification of “non-citizen”.52
This is largely the result of harsh laws passed
in the early 1990’s which prevented those
who arrived in Latvia during Soviet times
from becoming fully naturalized citizens.
Non-citizens in Latvia are denied the
opportunity to participate in formal political
processes, cannot work in government, and do
not have freedom of mobility within the
European Union.53
To make matters worse, the general use of
Russian language in Latvia has also faced
legal restrictions. A 2018 law approved by
Latvia’s parliament and president severely
limits the use of Russian language in schools
across the country despite the fact that many
students speak and understand little to no
Latvian.54
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Both Lithuania and Estonia have taken more
progressive approaches to ensuring that
Russians living within their borders have
opportunities equal to those of their ethnically
native neighbors.55 Yet, in an effort to
preserve its sovereignty and erase the legacy
of Soviet occupation, Latvia effectively
played into the hands of Kremlin-backed
propagandists and provoked the birth of proRussian political movements within its
borders.56 In order to counter the impact of
such movements, NATO allies ought to
encourage Latvia to adopt policies similar to
those of its neighbors to the north and south,
which open the door for citizenship and
tolerate the use of Russian language in official
capacities.
NATO has recognized the threat of cyber
warfare and much progress has already been
made with regards to cyber security in the
Baltics. For example, upon request from
Estonia in 2008 the alliance established the
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence. The size and scope of this entity’s
responsibilities has grown over the course of
the past decade, and it remains responsible for
research and implementation of technology,
operations, strategy, and law relating to the
cyber domain.57 With the assistance of allies,
the Baltics’ security apparatus to include
military, law enforcement, and intelligence
entities has become hardened against cyberattacks.
However, one of the greatest remaining
challenges with cyber security in the Baltics is
the threat to private, non-governmental
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entities. Since the end of the Cold War, many
elements of national security and defense
which were previously the responsibility of
the state have been contracted out and turned
over to the private sector. This is especially
true with regards to transportation and
communication networks, both of which are
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.58
Valuable organizations and networks which
are not directly connected to national security
or NATO are also subject to threats in the
cyber realm. This includes media outlets,
internet providers, cell networks, health care
facilities, banks, and energy infrastructure
among many other things. Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia each pride themselves on having
fostered a unique culture of technological
innovation and expansion.59
As a result, nearly everything and everyone in
this region is, in some way, connected and
dependent upon the internet. Evidence shows
that Russia clearly understands this
dependency and has at least begun to explore
methods to exploit weaknesses in the cyber
domain in the Baltics’ private sector. In recent
years, cyber operatives connected to Russia
have infiltrated and impacted energy
infrastructure, banking systems, and cell
service networks in the Baltics.60
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cyber security. Moving forward, military,
intelligence, and law enforcement
organizations in the Baltics must work with
civilian partners to ensure that the cyber realm
is secure.
CONCLUSION
Extended deterrence, as traditionally
practiced by NATO, provides an outdated
model for security in Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia. Today, the threat from Russia facing
the newest and most vulnerable members of
the alliance transcends the military domain
and includes a wide array of subversive, nonviolent, and non-kinetic activities. Increasing
the number of allied forces in the region and
improving interoperability demonstrate a
strong commitment to deterrence. However,
the likelihood of a conventional, kinetic attack
is low.
The presence of soldiers and warplanes
cannot prevent information warfare or cyberattacks before they take place. For this reason,
NATO must begin strengthening resiliency in
the Baltics. By improving the condition of
Russian speaking people, combating
propaganda, and strengthening cyber security
in the private sector, the Baltics will be more
capable of enduring Russian aggression over
time.

Loss of access to any of these services could
cripple the economy and shake citizens’ faith
in the state. NATO, backed by the United
States influence and resources, must expand
the cooperative relationship between the
public and private sectors with regards to
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Book Review
Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against
Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (NY: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 252 pp.
Damon Coletta
This review is dedicated to Lt Gen (ret.) Brent Scowcroft, twice National Security Advisor and one-time
head of the Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy. If he is looking down on our work
today, we hope he liked this book, Death of Expertise, by a much admired Naval War College professor
and enjoyed our department’s enthusiasm for participating in the conversation. Thank you, Gen
Scowcroft (1925-2020).

Naval War College professor Tom
Nichols built upon his popular essay in the
Atlantic to deliver a blunt warning.1 After a
venomous election in 2016 that swept the
incumbent party from power, American
democracy was in for a rough go. Sir
Lawrence Freedman (Emeritus, King’s
College, London) employed the term
“polemic” to characterize Death of Expertise,
and Nichols did take shots at certain
celebrities professing bizarre, defiantly
unscientific, nostrums for better health. Yet,
Nichols, the strategist and foreign policy
expert, had a loftier aim and a deeper message
in mind than disarming the army of nattering
nabobs on American social media.
Expertise is also a eulogy for a young and
strong United States in geopolitical terms, for
a period, a lifetime ago, when Americans
from all walks attentively tuned the radio to
absorb learned rhetoric of the Commander-inChief and earnestly assume their civic
obligations as ordinary citizens in time of
world war. Nichols’ framing of the problem
is at once profoundly conservative and antiTrump, at least the popular Trumpism in
2016-2017 that pilloried expert professionals
1

Damon Coletta is 2020-2021 Scowcroft Professor in
the Dept. of Political Science, U.S. Air Force
Academy, author of Courting Science: Securing the

from doctors to diplomats, then ran them out
on a rail from positions of influence on
America’s future.
For the long decline of American democracy,
Nichols located the mortal wound in the
decade of the 1970s. Failed intervention in
Southeast Asia and the frustrated civil rights
movement at home culminated in violent
protest, riots, and proliferation of crimes—
kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and a
White House scandal—splashed across
national media. America appeared to recover
from the discord at first, claiming victory in
the Cold War and achieving a long sail of
peace and economic growth during the 1990s.
Nichols explained, though, how new factors
such as emergence of the Internet, customeroriented concessions in higher education, and
fragmentation of the media into cult punditry
accelerated internal bleeding, cementing then
spreading as a cancer popular skepticism of
professional expertise.
If Nichols’ diagnosis is correct, the American
experiment is in trouble. Nichols’ anchoring
chapter on “Death of Expertise and
Democracy” pointed out that experts across
Foundation for a Second American Century (Stanford,
2016), and coeditor of this journal.
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the professions are losing patience with the
public and, for their part, regular citizens are
in no mood to grant credentialed pontificators
the benefit of the doubt. With general
breakdown of communications between the
professions and society, Nichols wrote, “all
things are possible,” including “the end of
democracy,” either by foreign intrigue or
policy paralysis of republican government.
These were the very threats to the American
experiment George Washington spotlighted as
he bequeathed the presidency in his classic
1796 Farewell Address.
Nichols, though, offers a fresh twist on the
Washington Post’s latest motto, “Democracy
dies in darkness.” For Nichols, the looming
darkness is not what most Americans would
fear at onset, say, sudden suppression by a
man on horseback or a popular fascist
crushing the minority’s capacity to see or
seek. Rather, the darkness is insidious. There
is too much light at first, too much access, so
many choices that free citizens lose their way.
Anyone can become informed. Every
citizen’s judgment counts as good as the next
opinion—on health, justice, science, or public
policy.
In his telling, Nichols approached the
nineteenth century aristocrat Alexis de
Tocqeville’s Democracy in America.
Freedom and democracy do not actually
suffocate in pitch darkness. They drown in
blooming, buzzing confusion—restless
citizens chasing every which way an unholy
Grail of universal equality. Such rigid
uniformity in tackling the world’s problems
precludes specialization and excellence in the
professions, undermines a key principle of
social cohesion, and dashes hopes for a great,
diverse Union that can be a beacon of human
liberty as John Winthrop’s City on a Hill.
To this point, Nichols trod on familiar ground,
but he also wanted to argue that this time is
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different. If expertise can die only once, the
American people have only one shot. Once
they kill philosophy by arresting its seers who
profess truths just beyond the ken of ordinary
folk, once they tear down talented specialists
and lock them away from societal influence,
there is no going back to science based policy.
Once unmoored from expertise, the free polity
cuts its engines, adrift forever.
Here, Nichols may have exaggerated his
indictment, with the result that the death of
expertise appears a most urgent threat to
democracy’s survival, but the obligation of
experts to do something about it is practically
set aside. Sure, educated professionals must
remain cognizant of limits of their discipline
and graciously accept defeat when politicians
or layperson clients decide to reject best
advice. Nichols reserved the real task,
though, for citizens, who en masse must find
the wherewithal to look up from their daily
cares and restore national faith in scientific
elements of liberal education—that this
process will produce experts who want to do
good and know what they are talking about.
The great twentieth century (expert) political
scientist Samuel Huntington thought
differently, that is, in terms of cycles or what
he called creedal passion periods. The
American Revolution and struggle to ratify
the United States Constitution represented the
first such period. Every sixty years or so, a
generation would rise to challenge established
ways of the democratic Republic, in short, to
tear down old expertise and construct new
institutions to shoulder the nation closer
toward its founding ideals. American
democracy, Huntington wrote, was a
“disappointment only because it is also a
hope.” The latter half of the American cycle,
the recovery or upswing, is absent from
Nichols’ account, and this omission changes
everything.
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The American people are not killing expertise
or the possibility of creative specialization in
society. In their freedom, they are alert—not
confused—when creaking social structures no
longer keep pace with demand for prosperity
and greater justice under liberal democracy.
Once the old towers have fallen, there will
come a historic moment, a Bretton Woods
convocation or a Sputnik imperative, when
expertise attuned to contemporary challenges
is called back to life in service to the national
experiment. The upshot of Huntington’s
theory of the case, as opposed to Nichols’, is
the public will probably follow their usual
cycle. It is the experts who need to be
prepared to act well when their moment
arrives.
While both Nichols and Huntington would be
cautious about predicting just where
democracy is in a political cycle while
relations with science are in flux, the 2016
election surprised most experts. Three years
later, President Trump was impeached by the
House and soon thereafter acquitted by the
Senate on contradictory, partisan votes. The
tumult in Washington may turn out to be
symptomatic, announcing an unusual dearth
of trust in expertise or professional staffs that
ought to bring warring factions together and
set a wise course for the country. The
COVID-19 pandemic may have hit too soon
in the cycle for expert professionals to slip
into place and ferry elected politicians
expeditiously through twin health and
economic crises.
Experts, nevertheless, are on the case, and
there may yet be an opening with the
American people to help political leaders,
divided across federal branches and individual
state governments, in record time implement
science based policy tied to COVID vaccines.
Closer to the substantive focus of this journal,
year 2019 also saw the inauguration of the

U.S. Space Force (USSF), a separate service
under the department and civilian secretary of
the Air Force. The birth of USSF manifests a
stunningly swift shift in political headwinds
against its creation a few short years before.
Many defense policy experts counseled
against the move.
Rather than the death of expertise, though,
USSF coming into being presents an
opportunity, albeit on a different plane from
COVID—one of those moments at the
upswing of Huntington’s passion periods for
another epistemic community to apply its
specialized knowledge in service to the
greater good.
Talented members of the professional classes,
meanwhile, have no time to wait for a positive
swing in the public mood. They will come
around, according to the existing pattern, the
cyclical relationship between democracy and
the professions. Still, military officers and
civilian defense experts have immediate
social responsibility to help their political
masters, representatives accountable to the
people, lead public opinion toward workable
solutions for the new Space Force as well as
the current pandemic.
Expertise is not dying. Contemporary
politicians merely sent its purveyors back to
the woodshed to work a bit harder, to sharpen
their skills and knowledge for success against
novel national challenges. Adapting and
applying expertise within a democratic
political context will soon be the sacred labor
of educated elites on space, health, the
environment, education, and the economy.
Nichols’ recommendations in his book for
today’s experts unfortunately languished at
second-priority status. The best professionals
already recall, always remember, that they are
the advisers not the deciders, the servants not
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the masters, of democratic society and
republican government.
Today’s experts have multiple jobs to do.
Politicians backed by the public are
requesting help on a variety of national issues
that cut across academic disciplines and tap a
mix of professions. These will not always see
eye-to-eye on the way forward. Informed
voices will not always cohere. Nevertheless,
public clamor for genuine expertise is likely
to mount, not die away, after the 2020
election.
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Expert professionals will abandon their duty
if they shrink from the kind of politicized
popular criticism that so exasperated Nichols.
If the current creedal passion period will soon
end, as in past cycles, the professional
response to enormous national challenges has
to be sober recognition of false starts, clear
explanations of lessons learned from hardwon experience, and steady, confident
management of accountable government in a
great democracy.
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